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INTRODUCTION
Federal administrative agencies have established safety standards
or licensing procedures for airplanes,1 motor vehicles,2 pesticides,'
drugs,4 medical devices,5 and a variety of other products. 6 At the
same time, product sellers are subject to tort liability even though
their products comply with applicable federal safety standards.7 Prod-
uct sellers maintain that compliance with federal safety standards
ought to protect them from liability under state tort law and have re-
lied upon several legal principles to support this claim. The first, and
1. See 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (granting the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) authority to control the design and safety requirements of aircraft).
2. See 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 30101-30162 (West Supp. 1995) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1381, 1391, 1395, 1396 (1988)) (directing the Secretary of Transportation to promul-
gate safety standards for motor vehicles).
3. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1994) (authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate
the development, manufacture, sale, and use of pesticides).
4. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 331-337,
341-353, 355-363, 371-379, 381-383, 391-394 (1994); Public Health Service Act (PHSA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 247b, 262 (1994); Anne N. James, Comment, Warnings and the Pharmaceutical
Companies: Legal Status of the Package Insert, 16 Hous. L. REv. 140, 143 (1978) (stating that
FDCA and PHSA combine to authorize the FDA to regulate virtually all aspects of the
manufacture and marketing of pharmaceutical products).
5. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(1976) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k (1994) (authorizing FDA to approve the
manufacture and sale of medical devices).
6. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines,
44 S.C. L. REv. 187, 189-90 (1993) (describing various federal product safety statutes).
7. Garey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67
MINN. L. REv. 343, 367 (1982) (indicating that compliance with federal safety standards
.constitutes some evidence of adequacy of the product's design, but is not conclusive").
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most successful, theory is federal preemption.' Under this concept,
Congress may expressly or impliedly assert the primacy of federal law
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,9 thereby dis-
placing competing (or even complementary) state regulation.'" So
far, product manufacturers have successfully invoked the doctrine of
preemption to defeat damage claims by injured consumers in connec-
tion with cigarette labeling, pesticide labeling, motor vehicle design,
and medical device labeling and design."1
The regulatory compliance defense is another concept that can
limit tort liability. In its strong version, the regulatory compliance de-
fense provides that a product is not defective if it meets applicable
regulatory standards or requirements. However, very fewjurisdictions
recognize regulatory compliance as a complete defense to tort liabil-
ity. Instead, most courts allow juries to take compliance with regula-
tory standards into account, but steadfastly refuse to treat federal
safety standards as anything more than minimum standards.
12
Many commentators have argued that courts should pay more
deference to federal product safety standards." This position is based
on the assumption that administrative agencies generally do a good
job of regulating product safety.' 4 Consequently, manufacturers
whose products comply with these standards should not ordinarily be
required to comply with additional standards imposed upon them by
8. See Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 Bun'.
L. REv. 181, 181 (1991) (stating that federal preemption is a popular defense in product
liability cases because of the predominant role of federal agencies in regulating products).
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see infra note 101.
10. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 183 (discussing the doctrine of federal preemption of
state law).
11. See infra part III.
12. See infra part IV.
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REv.
1139, 1151 (1987) ("What is needed, I believe, is a rule that provides that certain warnings
approved by, say, the FDA shall be conclusively regarded as adequate in any subsequent
lawsuit."); James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liabil-
ity: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 321 (1990) ("Courts recogniz-
ing the limits of their institutional capabilities should refuse to second-guess thejudgments
of agencies who possess not only expertise but also a capacity for knowledge and memory
which the courts cannot match."); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 335 (1985) ("Once a determi-
nation has been made by an expert licensing agency, the courts should respect it."); John
P. Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHIo
N.U. L. Rzv. 249, 261 (1977) ("[W]here government standards have been promulgated,
there should be adopted judicially, or adopted by legislative action if necessary, a limitation
on product design responsibility to coincide with the 'state of the art' or the level of 'skill
in performance' as reflected by the governmental standards.").
14. See infra part II.
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principles of state tort law. 15 On the other hand, injured consumers
should be allowed to challenge federal safety standards that are obso-
lete or inadequate." Because under the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion, federal standards would displace tort liability even when they
were inadequate, preemption should be rejected as a comprehensive
solution to the problem of dual regulation.17
The regulatory compliance defense has more flexibility because it
would allow injured parties to challenge unsatisfactory regulatory stan-
dards. Unfortunately, the regulatory compliance defense, as it pres-
ently exists in most states, provides virtually no protection to
manufacturers whose products comply with federal safety standards.
However, a stronger regulatory compliance defense, which would im-
munize manufacturers from tort liability as long as their products sat-
isfied reasonably adequate federal safety standards, may be a more
promising solution to the problem of dual regulation."
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of significant fed-
eral product safety legislation. Part II sets forth the argument that
administrative agencies can regulate product safety more cheaply and
effectively than tort law. The concept of federal preemption is dis-
cussed and critiqued in part III. Part IV focuses on the conventional
treatment of regulatory compliance in products liability law and pro-
poses a "strong" regulatory compliance defense that will foreclose
most damage claims against product manufacturers who comply with
federal safety standards. Finally, part V analyzes the effect such a pro-
posal would have on product safety and the compensation of injured
consumers. The Article concludes that the administrative cost savings
that a strong regulatory compliance defense would achieve should
more than offset any negative effects that the defense might have on
product safety and victim compensation.
15. See Raleigh, supra note 13, at 261 ("It is patently absurd that the machinery of gov-
ernmental standard setting should be observed through vigorous procedures, and that de-
signers should be required to meet the mark of that standard, only to have their designs
second guessed and their responsibilities expanded case by case .... ).
16. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. Rv. 625, 638-40 (1978) (discussing a proposed product
liability reform statute that would allow a plaintiff to overcome a presumption that a prod-
uct was safe, simply because it complied with federal regulations, by producing clear and
convincing evidence that the regulation was inadequate).
17. Id. at 638-39 ("Not all regulations sufficiently protect against risks to merit being
employed as standards in product liability cases. To accept without question all regulations
would be to prejudice unfairly the rights of plaintiffs in some cases.").
18. See infta part V.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PRODUCT SAFETY LEGISLATION
Federal agencies play a major role in the regulation of product
safety.19 For example, the Consumer Product Safety Act of 197220 cre-
ated the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 21 to issue
safety standards for consumer products. 22 These standards impose re-
quirements for design, construction, packaging, warnings, instruc-
tions, and product performance. 3 In addition, the Commission has
the power to ban consumer products that cannot be made safe
through the enforcement of such standards.24 The Commission also
administers various "transferred acts," such as the Flammable Fabrics
Act,25 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act,26 the Child Protection
and Toy Safety Act of 1969,27 and the Poison Prevention Packaging
Act of 1970.28
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) 29 authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
regulate the manufacture, sale, and use of pesticides.3" All pesticides
must be registered with the EPA before they can be sold.31 The EPA
will permit registration of a pesticide only if it can perform its in-
tended function safely and "without unreasonably adverse effect on
the environment."3 2 The EPA regulates product labeling as part of its
registration process.33 The Agency not only approves particular warn-
ing language for a product, but also specifies the type, size, color, and
placement of such warnings.34
19. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing various federal regulatory
statutes).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994).
21. See id. § 2053 (describing the composition and authority of the CPSC.
22. Id. § 2056(a)(1)-(2).
23. Id. Section 2056 states:
A consumer product safety standard shall consist of one or more of any of the
following types of requirements: (1) Requirements expressed in terms of per-
formance requirements. (2) Requirements that a consumer product be marked
with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or require-
ments respecting the form of warnings or instructions.
Id.
24. Id. § 2057.
25. Id. §§ 1191-1204.
26. Id. §§ 1261-1277.
27. Id. §§ 1261, 1262, 1274, 1278.
28. Id. §§ 1471-1474, 1976.
29. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
30. Id. §§ 136, 136a, 136w.
31. Id. § 136a(a), (c).
32. Id. § 136a(c) (5) (C).
33. Id. § 136a(c) (5) (B), (c)(6).
34. See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a) (1995).
1214 [VOL. 55:1210
1996] A "STRONG" REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE 1215
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196635 di-
rects the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate safety require-
ments for automobiles and other motor vehicles.16  Each safety
standard must protect the public against "unreasonable risk of acci-
dents occurring because of the design, construction, or performance
of motor vehicles and ... unreasonable risk of death or injury in an
accident.""7 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards currently govern
safety glass, door strength and latch design, fuel system integrity, occu-
pant protection, and numerous other aspects of motor vehicle
safety.
38
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 9 and the Public
Health Service Act' authorize the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate the development, production, testing, and labeling
of chemical drugs and biological products.41 The FDA requires man-
ufacturers to produce, package, and store all pharmaceutical products
in accordance with prescribed "Good Manufacturing Practice."42 In
addition, the FDA must license new prescription drugs before they
can be marketed.4" This licensing process begins with the submission
35. See Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966). This statute was originally codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391, 1392, 1395, 1396 (1988). In 1994, the statute was recodified. Pub. L.
No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is
now codified as 49 U.S.CA §§ 30101-30162 (Supp. 1995).
36. 49 U.S.CA § 30111(a) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1392).
37. Id. § 30102(a) (8) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (1)). See generally Michael
D. Hitt, Comment, Occupant Protection in Automobiles-Air Bags and Other Passive Restraints:
The State of the Art, the Federal Standard, and Beyond, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 635, 643 (1978)
(declaring that the federal standard is one of "reasonable safety").
38. See StephenJ. Werber, The Products Liability Revolution-Proposals for Continued Legis-
lative Responses in the Automotive Industy, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 46 (1982-83).
39. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1994).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
41. 41 U.S.C. § 262 (1988 & Supp. 111990); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 343 (1994) (indicating that the FDA, along with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA), also regulates the labeling of food and other products for
human consumption); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994) (declar-
ing congressional policy that the packaging and labeling of consumer products should
enable the purchaser to obtain accurate information regarding the content and quality of
the product); Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601, 611 (1994) (authorizing
USDA meat inspection program); Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031, 1036
(1994) (authorizing USDA egg inspection program); Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 451, 457 (1994) (authorizing USDA poultry inspection program).
42. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1995) (drugs); 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (1995) (medical devices); see
also Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and Prod-
ucts Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 194, 203-04 (1987) (discussing
the new drug approval process).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
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of an Investigational New Drug (IND) application,4 and if the IND
application is approved, the manufacturer is then allowed to prepare
a formal New Drug Application (NDA) .4 The NDA must contain all
information that is known about the drug at the time of the applica-
tion.46 Prior to licensing, experts review the data in the NDA and de-
termine that the drug is safe and effective for its intended purpose.47
Vaccines and other biological products are subject to a similar licens-
481ing process.
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)49 authorize the
FDA to approve the manufacture and sale of medical devices.50 New
devices are approved by a Premarket Approval Application (PMA)
process that involves clinical testing of the product and review of test
results by a panel of outside experts.51 Medical devices that are "sub-
stantially equivalent" to products that were in commercial distribution
prior to the passage of the MDA may be licensed under a less rigorous
procedure.52
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting under the au-
thority of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,53 regulates commercial
and private aircraft safety.5 4 As a part of this responsibility, the FAA
promulgates airworthiness standards, known as Federal Aviation Stan-
dards or "FARS."5' These regulations impose requirements for air-
44. Id. § 355(i). See generaly Note, A Question of Competence: TheJudicial Role in the Regu-
lation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HAv. L. REv. 773, 776 (1990) (describing the contents of an
IND application).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
46. Id.; see also Pennington P. Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industy: Can
Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 85, 100 (1988) (describing the contents of an
NDA).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988); see 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(1)-(16) (1995) (detailing
reasons for denying approval of an NDA).
48. See generally Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemp-
tion Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 688-89 (1989) (discussing FDA regulation of vaccines and
biologics).
49. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976)
(codified in part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k (1994)).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. See generally Edward M. Basile, Improving FDA's Product Approval
Process for Medical Devices, 41 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1986) (discussing the time
delays associated with obtaining approval by the FDA for new medical devices).
51. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)-(g), 360e(c); see Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 42, at 207.09
(discussing the PMA process).
52. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1) (A) (i)-(ii), 360e(b).
53. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
54. Id. § 1421 (authorizing the FAA to impose regulations to promote the safety of civil
aircraft).
55. See id. § 1421(a)(1) (granting the FAA authority to establish minimum safety stan-
dards relating to aircraft design, materials, construction, and performance of aircraft en-
gines and systems).
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craft performance and flight characteristics, structural integrity, fuel
systems, hydraulic systems, electrical systems, engines, instruments,
lights, and safety equipment.
56
Finally, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)5 7 re-
quires employers to provide a safe workplace for their employees and
to comply with all occupational safety and health standards promul-
gated under the Act.5 8 These standards are formulated by the Depart-
ment of Labor and cover virtually every aspect of worker safety,
including safety standards for industrial machinery.59 In this fashion,
the Department exercises considerable, though indirect, control over
product safety.
II. Ex ANTE REGULATION VERSUS Ex POST LIABILiiY
Products liability is a mixture of state tort law and federal regula-
tion.6° Although both of these approaches seek to achieve an optimal
level of product safety, they operate in very different ways. 6 ' Federal
administrative agencies regulate product safety directly by establishing
mandatory requirements that manufacturers must meet in order to
sell their products to the public.6" In contrast, tort liability regulates
product safety indirectly by holding manufacturers liable to injured
parties for product-related accident costs. 63 A comparison of these
56. Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1995) (describing FARS for general aviation); 14 C.F.R.
Pt. 25 (1995) (describing FARS for transport aircraft).
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-1678 (1994).
58. Id. § 654(a). See generally Barbara M.G. Lynn, Comment, The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970: Its Role in Civil Litigation, 28 Sw. L.J. 999, 999-1003 (1974) (describing
the purpose and enforcement procedures of OSHA).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1994).
60. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989) (discussing how product manufacturers are subject to a dual
system of regulation).
61. See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input
and Output Monitoring, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 205-09 (1977) (comparing ex ante regulation,
which employs standards in order to prevent harm from ever occurring, with ex post liabil-
ity, which imposes liability for harm caused from the violation of standards); Christopher
D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YA E LJ. 1, 16-
19 (1980) (discussing harm-based liability rules, which are triggered upon the occurrence
of the harm, and standards-based liability rules, which attempt to prevent harm from ever
occurring).
62. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W. ONT. L. REv.
111, 112 (1979) ("There is also the regulatory approach to deterrence with some institu-
tion in society determining standards of safety for activities and requiring that those stan-
dards are met.").
63. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 1139 ("Tort remedies tend to operate by indirection:
There is no direct supervision over the behavior of the various parties who, it is hoped, are
induced to perform properly by the threat of actions for damages.").
12171996]
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approaches suggests that in many ways direct regulation is a superior
method of risk control for products.'
A. Advantages of Ex Ante Regulation
One advantage of ex ante regulation is that its mandates are spe-
cific and uniform. In addition, regulatory agencies have the necessary
competence to make correct decisions about product safety issues,
and also have effective methods of enforcing their safety require-
ments. Finally, and most importantly, regulation of product safety by
federal agencies is relatively inexpensive.
1. Specificity and Unformity.-Regulatory safety standards may be
either descriptive or performance oriented. Descriptive or specifica-
tion standards mandate the use of particular materials, processes, de-
signs, or labeling.6" Performance standards describe the performance
characteristics of a product but do not specify how these characteris-
tics are to be achieved.66 Performance standards are thought superior
to descriptive standards because they allow for flexibility without sacri-
ficing the benefits of specificity.6 However, both descriptive stan-
dards and performance standards are more specific than tort liability
rules.6" Unlike regulatory safety standards, tort liability rules regard-
ing causation and foreseeability are often open-ended and
contextual.69
64. The discussion below should not be regarded as an argument for every form of
regulation. Federal regulatory programs are often unnecessary, ineffective, wasteful, and
oppressive. The point that I am trying to make is that existing federal safety standards on
product labeling and design are preferable in most cases to equivalent regulation under
tort law.
65. SeeJames A. Brodsky & Marsha N. Cohen, "Uncle Sam," the Product Safety Man: Con-
sumer Product Safety Standards in the Marketplace and in the Courts, 2 HoFsTRA L. REv. 619, 624
(1974) (asserting that descriptive standards limit design initiatives).
66. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory State, in TORT LAW AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREsT 80, 95 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (promoting the superior incentive
characteristics of performance standards).
67. See John Braithwaite, The Limits of Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Con-
duct, 16 LAw & Soc'y REv. 481, 483-84 (1981-82) (enumerating the advantages of perform-
ance standards over descriptive standards).
68. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 638 ("The utility of federal product safety regula-
tions as standards for decision is their specificity.").
69. For example, in failure-to-warn cases, concepts like causation and foreseeability
make it difficult to determine what a manufacturer must do to meet its duty. See Hender-
son & Twerski, supra note 13, at 270 ("Concepts such as risk foreseeability, risk-utility bal-
ancing, and proximate causation are so devoid of content in the failure-to-warn context
that they cannot hope to test the bona fides of the plaintiffs claim."); W. Kip Viscusi et al.,
Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1437, 1468 (1994) [hereinafter Viscusi et al.,
Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation] ("In the context of warnings litigation, the absence of
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Another advantage of federal regulations is that they apply uni-
formly throughout the country. Uniform standards allow manufactur-
ers to take advantage of economies of scale because they do not have
to employ different product designs and labeling for different mar-
kets.7" Tort liability doctrines, on the other hand, often vary widely
from state to state. This lack of uniformity increases production costs
without providing any increased safety benefit.
2. Agency Decision-making. -Regulatory agencies are generally
well-equipped to make objective decisions about risk management
and other product safety issues.7 First of all, agency personnel are
likely to be familiar with the technical aspects of the products they
regulate and, when necessary, they can commission studies and obtain
advice from outside experts.7" Second, the procedures by which prod-
uct safety standards are formulated provide the agency with opinions
and information from a wide variety of sources. Consequently, agen-
cies can take a diversity of interests into account when they make deci-
sions about product safety. 7 3
meaningful standards is quite troublesome."). In design defect cases, the risk-utility test,
which sets forth a number of factors for consideration by the jury, is far too vague to pro-
vide clear answers to either manufacturers orjuries. SeeW. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the
Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 573, 575-76 (1990) [hereinafter Viscusi,
Wading Through the Muddle] (arguing that the risk-utility test in design defects cases is too
vague). But see Steven L. Holley, Note, The Relationship Between Federal Standards and Litiga-
tion in the Control of Automotive Design, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 804, 820 (1982) ("The problem of
uncertainty is outweighed by the value of preserving independent, decentralized determi-
nations of design deficiency by a politically insulated judiciary.").
70. See Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism,
70 VA. L. R~v. 1429, 1462-63 (1984) ("If many states have differing design standards, na-
tional marketing becomes constrained and economies of scale become impossible."); Mary
Lee A. Howarth, Comment, Preemption and Punitive Damages: The Conflict Continues Under
FJFRA, 136 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1301, 1324-25 (1988) (discussing product labeling problems that
would result if pesticide labeling was regulated by the individual states).
71. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 335 (1985) ("Regulatory agencies are equipped to make
the risk comparisons on which all progressive transformation of the risk environment must
be based."); Naile, supra note 48, at 694 (noting that federal agencies have greater ability
than laymen to evaluate the safety of products).
72. See Holley, supra note 69, at 819 (finding that one advantage of federal regulation
over tort liability is the ability of regulatory agencies to research broad safety concerns as
opposed to the narrow issues involved in individual cases).
73. See W. KIP ViscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LLtziui-v 212 (1991) ("[W]e should ...
attempt to shift the task of promoting product safety to those institutions [such as adminis-
trative agencies] that are better equipped to handle the necessary societal tradeoffs."); Dix
A. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 258
(1969) ("An administrative agency, after extensive and impartial research, can understand
engineering complexities better than ajury, and can better balance against safety the other
interests such as economy, style and performance."); Huber, supra note 71, at 335 ("Regu-
1219
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On the other hand, courts are institutionally incapable of resolv-
ing complicated product safety issues.74 In the first place, both judges
and lay juries often have difficulty understanding technical or scien-
tific evidence.75 Second, access to information is limited because liti-
gants have no incentive to provide courts with information unless it
supports their position.7" Finally, the case-specific nature of the trial
process causes courts and juries to focus on narrow issues and pre-
vents them from paying proper attention to broader social or safety
concerns.
77
3. Enforcement. -Administrative agencies have a wide assortment
of enforcement devices at their disposal.78 An agency may secure
compliance with safety standards by such measures as inspections and
licensing procedures. In addition, an agency can respond to potential
safety threats by ordering recalls of dangerous products.7 9  Finally,
when violations occur, federal agencies can enforce civil or criminal
penalties against the guilty parties. Although some commentators
have criticized federal agencies for lax enforcement of product safety
latory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on which all progressive trans-
formation of the risk environment must be based."). But see Barry R. Furrow, Governing
Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1403, 1437 (1983) ("The relative
freedom of the courts from short-term political pressures gives them a unique perspective
from which to gauge the long-term risks and implications of major new developments,
without the unique problems associated with administrative agencies.").
74. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1531 (1973) ("Courts are inherently
unsuited to the task of establishing product safety standards in cases involving the liability
of manufacturers."); Huber, supra note 71, at 319 ("[T]ort liability is a poor vehicle for
choosing risks because judges and juries have little capacity to make risk choices wisely.").
75. See Scott G. Lindvall, Note, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Should Courts Set the Standards?,
27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 401 (1986) (discussing the difficulties courts and juries have in
understanding aircraft design issues); Peter J. Mooney, Note, Judicial Participation in the
Establishment of Vehicle Safety Standards: A System in Need of Reform, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 902, 919-20
(1981) (indicating that juries have difficulty discerning between design choices that were
selected and those that were rejected by motor vehicle manufacturers).
76. Henderson, supra note 74, at 1532-33 (indicating the inability of courts to ade-
quately investigate safety standard decisions by manufacturers).
77. See Viscusi, supra note 73, at 8-9 ("[T]he courts are not regulatory agencies and do
not have the expertise to set safety levels, especially since they must act within the narrow
perspective of a particular case."); Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARv. L. REV. 773, 780 (1990) ("[T]he narrow focus of
the trial setting and the tort system's reliance on lay juries as the final arbiter of complex
scientific issues make it difficult for the tort system to internalize scientific data
appropriately.").
78. See Dueffert, supra note 60, at 177 (describing the various enforcement mechanisms
that regulatory agencies employ).
79. Id.
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standards,8" agencies generally do a good job of enforcing their ex-
isting regulations.8 1 In contrast, the tort system relies entirely upon
private enforcement. As a result, the judicial response to product
safety problems is haphazard at best.82
4. Administrative Costs. -As a system of risk control, ex ante regu-
lation is much cheaper to administer than ex post liability systems such
as tort law.8" The administrative costs of government regulation in-
clude the general expenses of maintaining an agency staff as well as
the cost of formulating and enforcing safety standards. The tort sys-
tem's administrative costs include the costs to manufacturers of dis-
cerning the applicable safety standards under tort law.84 They also
include the legal expenses incurred by plaintiffs, defendants, and lia-
bility insurers to adjudicate damage claims.8" In addition, some of the
80. See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort
Reform, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1129, 1182 (1994) ("[Tlhe vast scope of potential product risks, the
constantly changing array of consumer products and the technology which it embodies,
and the inherently limited resources available to agencies, virtually assures that agencies
will sometimes fail to act even when legitimate product risks fall within theirjurisdiction.").
81. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler, From "Model Agency" to Basket Case-Can the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission Be Redeemed, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 61, 117 (1989) (noting that CPSC's
recall program is considered to be a great success story); Gregory C. Jackson, Comment,
Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to
Concurrent Regulations, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 199, 215-16 (1992) (-Though criticized in the past
as underfunded, ill-equipped, and incapable of effectively performing its public-protection
mandate, the FDA has recently been granted significant funding increases by Congress.").
82. For example, many injured parties fail to sue. See Robert A. Prentice & Mark E.
Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for
Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 251, 259 (1991-92) (finding that only one in ten of those
injured each year by defective products brings suit against manufacturers). At the same
time, excessive damage claims create an "overdeterrence" problem for some industries. See
Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug
Regulations, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 171, 177 (1986) (discussing the negative effect of tort
liability on development and introduction of new pharmaceutical products).
83. See Viscusi et al., Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation, supra note 69, at 1450 (1994)
("Direct regulation can sometimes achieve the social goal of deterring inefficient accidents
more economically and accurately than the indirect incentives provided through tort
law.").
84. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product Liability
Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENy. U. L. Rzv. 685, 692 (1988) ("Because
the rules vary from state to state.., both manufacturers and claimants spend unnecessary
time, effort and resources determining what the applicable legal rules are. .. ").
85. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 357,
363-64 (1984) ("[T]he costs of the tort system must be broadly defined to include the time,
effort, and legal expenses borne by private parties in the course of litigation or in coming
to settlements. .. ").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
expense of maintaining the civil courts may be attributed to the tort
system. 86
It is generally agreed that the tort system's administrative costs
are enormous." This is because manufacturers or their liability insur-
ers must spend large amounts of money to investigate, defend, and
settle product liability claims.88 Plaintiffs, of course, also incur heavy
litigation costs if their claims are contested.89 A study conducted by
the RAND Corporation during the mid-1980s estimated that net an-
nual compensation to plaintiffs under tort law totaled between $14
billion and $16 billion, while administrative costs ranged from $16 bil-
lion to $19 billion.90 Although more recent cost estimates are not
available, if one extrapolates the figures from these earlier studies, it is
86. One study estimated that the cost to the court system of the average tort case was
$407 per case in a state court and $1740 per case in a federal court. The overall expendi-
ture was $425 million. SeeJ.S. KAXAIK & R.L. Ross, COSTS OF THE CIL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
COURT EXPENDITURES FOR VAMOUS TYPES OF CIVIL CASES 81-85 (1983); see alsoJOHN G. FLEM-
ING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 18-21 (1988) (examining the transaction costs of the tort
system).
87. See FLEMING, supra note 86, at 18 ("The most negative feature of the tort system is its
staggering overhead cost."); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L.
REN,. 558, 596 (1985) ("[T] he tort system is fabulously expensive to operate in comparison
to modem compensation systems."); Jackson, supra note 81, at 233 ("Strict liability thus
creates excessive administrative or transactional costs in the form of litigation expenses
88. SeeJohn G. Fleming, Is There a Futurefor Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1207 (1984)
("Compensation [under the tort system] is dependent on issues of causation and fault,
which require investigation and are frequently contested.").
89. Most plaintiffs hire attorneys on a contingent fee basis. If successful, the attorney
typically receives about one-third of the plaintiff's recovery. See Lester Brickman, Contin-
gent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 30
(1989) (describing the one-third rate as "standard"); Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C.
Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 393 (1993) (noting
that the usual range of contingent percentage is 30% to 40%);John F. Vargo, The American
Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567,
1617 (1993) (discussing the contingent arrangement as generally a one-third percentage).
90. SeeJAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 69 (1986) ("To deliver this $14 to $16 billion in net compensation, the tort
litigation system expended $16 to $19 billion in transaction costs."). The administrative
costs of the tort system are not only high in absolute terms, but they are high in relation to
the amount of compensation paid to victims. According to one study, only 47 cents of
every dollar spent by manufacturers on product-related claims ultimately reaches the
claimant. See Michel A. Coccia, Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A Proposed Federal Solu-
tion, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 104, 117 (1984) (asserting that under the present system more
money goes to attorneys and claims investigators than injured claimants). In contrast, ap-
proximately 30% of the cost of the workers' compensation system is attributable to admin-
istrative costs. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance:
Myths and Realities, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 66, at 127, 135 (ques-
tioning whether the possible deterrence benefits warrant the high costs of the current
system). Administrative costs consume only 15% of the health insurance premium dollar
and 1% of the Social Security system dollar. Id.
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not unreasonable to conclude that the tort system's current adminis-
trative costs are probably in the $20 billion to $25 billion range. 91
The administrative costs of direct regulation seem modest by
comparison. For example, at the time of the RAND Corporation
study, the FDA's budget was $409 million, the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) budget was $246 million, and
CPSC's budget was only $34 million.92 Even today, the administrative
costs of direct regulation, as indicated by the budgets of various fed-
eral agencies, are still quite low in comparison with the administrative
costs of the tort system. For example, the proposed fiscal year (FY)
1997 budget for the FDA is $1.02 billion;9" a FY 1997 budget of $352
million was suggested for NHTSA;94 and CPSC's budget will be $43
million.9 5 These agency budgets add up to more than $1.5 billion.
Even if one includes the costs of product safety activities by such agen-
cies as the OSHA and the FAA, the total budgetary cost of direct regu-
lation for product safety probably does not exceed $2 billion per
year.96
In fairness, the administrative costs of direct regulation should
also take into account the cost to manufacturers of complying with
agency licensing, testing, and recordkeeping requirements.97
Although there is no way to calculate these costs precisely, it is doubt-
ful that they amount to more than several billion dollars a year. Ad-
ding this estimate to the $2 billion figure for current agency budgets
results in approximate administrative costs of government regulation
of $4 billion per year. This total is considerably less than the cost of
tort litigation involving defective products.9"
91. If we assume a 3% per year increase in administrative costs starting in 1985, the
RAND study's lower estimate of $16 billion would rise to $21.5 billion by 1995 and the
study's higher estimate of $19 billion would rise to about $25.5 billion by 1995.
92. See Adler, supra note 81, at 61 n.2.
93. See BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY (Mar. 20, 1996).
94. See INSIDE DOT & TRANsP. WEEK (Mar. 21, 1996).
95. See ANALYricAL PERSPECTrIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 484
(1996).
96. OSHA's proposed budget for FY 1997 is $341 million, but most of this will be spent
on other regulatory activities. Id. at 453-54. Likewise, the FAA's proposed budget for FY
1997 is $8.25 billion, but most of this will be spent on airport construction and air traffic
control. See INSIDE DOT & TRANsp. WEEK (Mar. 21, 1996).
97. The production costs that manufacturers incur in order to comply with additional
safety requirements are not considered to be administrative costs. In any event, if safety
regulations are economically efficient, marginal savings in liability costs will equal or ex-
ceed marginal costs for product safety.
98. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. Much of the $20 to $25 billion dollar
cost of the tort system covers automobile accidents, slip and fall cases, medical malpractice,
and other activities that are not directly regulated by federal administrative agencies. To
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B. Upholding the Primacy of Ex Ante Regulation
The foregoing discussion suggests that ex ante regulation is a
cheaper and more effective method of risk control than ex post liabil-
ity. At the present time, however, manufacturers must comply with
the requirements of both regulatory regimes. Unfortunately, this dual
system of regulation often sends conflicting signals to product manu-
facturers. For example, while the FDA strictly regulates the labeling
of pharmaceutical products in order to promote "rational prescrib-
ing" by physicians,99 the tort system frustrates this goal by encouraging
manufacturers to place warnings on their products that exaggerate
known risks or raise unwarranted concerns about hypothetical or un-
proven risks.100
Clearly, one system of risk control must prevail, while the other
system is restricted to a complementary or subordinate role. In view
of the inherent superiority of direct regulation over tort liability, it
appears that government standards should occupy this position of pri-
macy in the regulation of product safety. However, at the present
time, tort liability standards often prevail over government regulations
because courts treat the latter as makeweights rather than as authori-
tative judgments about product safety issues. Such judicial decisions
undermine the credibility and authority of agency decisionmaking
and impair the regulatory effect of federal safety standards.
Something needs to be done to ensure that federal safety stan-
dards are not marginalized by courts when product safety is at issue.
Federal preemption and the regulatory compliance defense are two
principles that can be used to compel courts to give more weight to
federal product safety standards. The remaining portions of this Arti-
cle will examine these concepts and will propose an approach that
emphasizes the strengths of both tort liability and government
regulation.
be fair, one must compare only the relative costs of tort law and federal regulation in the
products liability area. However, the cost of litigating product liability claims almost cer-
tainly exceeds the cost of federal product safety regulation.
99. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and
Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 238 (1986) ("FDA's interest is in ra-
tional prescribing."); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176, 1200 (NJ. 1991) ("[FDA]
has an interest in 'rational prescribing,' i.e., ensuring that the risks and benefits of a partic-
ular drug be fairly presented so that a physician can compare them with other available
therapies."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
100. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 82, at 187-88 (stating that if drug manufacturers are
compelled to notify
, 
physicians of every potential hazard of each drug, they will have a
strong incentive to press the FDA for approval of warnings based on unreliable
information).
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT LIABIITY CLAIMS
A. The Preemption Doctrine
According to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, fed-
eral legislation may preempt state law under certain circumstances.'
This same principle applies to state common-law doctrines102 and lo-
cal ordinances.103 Moreover, a federal agency, acting within the scope
of its authority, may also preempt state and local law.
104
Courts and commentators traditionally distinguish between vari-
ous types of preemption.'0 5 For example, express preemption occurs
when a federal statute or administrative regulation specifically ex-
cludes state regulation in a particular area.' 6 However, federal law
may also preempt state regulation when the federal government com-
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI states in pertinent part: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
102. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987) (holding
that the Clean Water Act preempts nuisance actions against out-of-state defendants); Chi-
cago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (holding that
the interstate Commerce Clause preempts state law tort claim based on abandonment of
railway service).
103. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973)
(holding that FAA regulations preempt a municipal airport curfew ordinance).
104. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984) (holding
that FCC regulations with respect to television cable operators preempt state law prohibit-
ing advertising of alcoholic beverages); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178
(1978) (holding that Department of Transportation regulations on oil tanker safety pre-
empt state tanker safety law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (holding that Treas-
ury regulations creating right of survivorship for holders of U.S. savings bonds preempt
state community property laws).
105. For a general discussion of the various categories of preemption, see Atwell, supra
note 8, at 183-91. See also Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public
Polity, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 897, 913-24 (1988) ("The
preemption doctrine is a reflection of the fact that Congress may pass legislation which
nullifies inconsistent state statutes."); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Re-
publican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 699-701 (1991) (discussing the nature of implied and
express preemption claims); Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court and Preemption Doc-
trine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1233, 1234-37 (1986) ("The
Supreme Court has traditionally recognized three types of pre-emption-express, conflict,
and occupation of the field."); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual"
Conflicts, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1743, 1796-98 (1992) (rejecting traditional preemption analysis
and proposing instead a unified approach to deciding conflicts between state and federal
law based on conflict-of-laws principles).
106. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983) (holding that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts state antidiscrimination law
requiring employers to pay sick leave benefits to pregnant employees); Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (holding that federal banking regulations preempt
state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses in residential mortgages).
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pletely occupies a particular regulatory field.' 7 In addition, state law
will be preempted when it is impossible to comply with both federal
and state law,108 when state law impairs the exercise of federal rights
or benefits, or when state law stands as an obstacle to federal regula-
tory goals.10 9
B. Preemption of State Product Liability Claims
In recent years, manufacturers have argued that tort claims
should be barred by the preemption doctrine when their products
comply with applicable federal labeling or design requirements.' 10
When a manufacturer invokes the preemption doctrine as a defense
to tort liability, the court must determine whether Congress intended
to foreclose tort suits by injured consumers. This task is complicated
by the fact that no federal product safety statute explicitly mentions
whether such tort claims are preempted. Despite this lack of legisla-
tive guidance, many courts have concluded that federal product safety
statutes preempt such claims.
1. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.--Section 1334(b)
of this Act declares that if cigarette packages carry the statutorily man-
dated health warning, no additional requirements or prohibitions re-
lating to smoking and health may be imposed under state law with
107. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988) (holding that
pervasive federal regulation preempts state law regulating financing of natural gas pipe-
lines); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-81 (1971) (holding that the dominant
federal interest in foreign affairs preempts state welfare eligibility requirements that dis-
criminate against aliens).
108. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(holding that when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, federal law
preempts state law).
109. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (holding
that a state law is preempted if it interferes with the methods by which a federal statute was
designed to achieve a certain goal); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricul-
tural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding that a state law authoriz-
ing producers' associations to engage in conduct that a federal act forbade stood as an
obstacle to congressional objectives and was consequently preempted by federal law); Mc-
Carty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981) (preempting state community property law that
reduced the value of federal life insurance contract for military personnel); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585 (1979) (holding that federal railroad retirement benefits are
not subject to state law claims of divorced spouse); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115,
137 (1913) (finding preemption of a state labeling law because it would subject syrup pro-
ducer who complied with federal law to criminal liability for mislabeling).
110. See generally Ausness, supra note 6, at 200-31 (discussing recent litigation involving
preemption of product liability claims); Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of
Tort Claims as the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REa'. 903, 926-38 (1996)
(same).
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respect to advertising or promotional activities."11 This language obvi-
ously prohibits states from imposing mandatory labeling requirements
by statute or administrative regulation.1 1 2 Until recently, however, it
was not clear whether the terms "requirements and prohibitions" in-
cluded liability imposed under principles of state tort law."1 This is-
sue was finally settled in 1992, when the Supreme Court in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc. I 4 held that the duty to warn was a state law require-
ment with respect to advertising and promotion, and as such, was ex-
pressly preempted by the Act.' 5 This holding effectively barred
failure-to-warn claims based on cigarette package labeling subsequent
to 1969.116
2. Consumer Product Safety Act.-The Consumer Product Safety
Act (CPSA) expressly preempts state product safety standards that dif-
fer from those promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion. 17 The Commission may exempt a state standard from
preemption if it concludes that the proposed standard provides "a sig-
nificantly higher degree of protection" from the product risk covered
by the existing federal standard and that the proposed state standard
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
112. See Leila B. Bouton, Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses
to Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 643, 655 (1987) (declaring that 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334 bars states from directly regulating cigarette labeling or advertising).
113. Although most courts concluded that the labeling act preempted state failure-to-
warn claims, almost all commentators prior to the Cipollone decision, see infra note 114 and
accompanying text, reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 105, at
924 (arguing that 15 U.S.C. § 1334 does not preempt claims under state tort law); Bruce A.
Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 Auz. L. REV. 195,
231-36 (1987) (concluding that the labeling act does not preempt state failure-to-warn
claims); Boulton, supra note 112, at 666 (stating that because of the strong presumption
against preemption, plaintiffs should be allowed to bring failure-to-warn claims against cig-
arette manufacturers); Taylor A. Ewell, Comment, Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litiga-
tion: Can Manufacturers Be Sued for Failure to Warn Even Though They Have Complied with
Federal Warning Requirements ?, 20 Lov. L.A L. REv. 867, 919 (1987) (stating that the ciga-
rette labeling act expresses congressional intent not to preempt state failure-to-warn
claims).
114. 112 S. CL 2608 (1992).
115. Id. at 2625. For an analysis of Cipollone, see Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the
Cipollone Case on Federal Preemption Law, 15J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 1, 6-18 (1993).
116. The Court concluded that the 1965 Act did not expressly preempt such claims.
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619. At the same time the Cipollone Court upheld a variety of other
claims, such as breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy
to misrepresent or conceal health risks associated with smoking. Id. at 2622-25.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1994); see also National Kerosene Heater Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 653 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that the CPSA would have pre-
empted a state statute regulating unvented kerosene heaters if the CPSC had issued
mandatory standards).
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will "not unduly burden interstate commerce."1 8 At the same time,
another provision of the Act declares that compliance with CPSA
safety standards will not immunize a manufacturer from civil liabil-
ity. 1 9 This suggests that the CPSA will not preempt product liability
claims by injured consumers.1 20
A number of decisions also test the preemptive effect of the Fed-
eral Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Flammable Fabrics
Act (FFA), both of which are administered by the CPSC. 121 The FHSA
has an express preemption provision. 122 This has led several courts to
conclude that compliance with the Act's labeling requirements will
preempt inadequate warning claims.1
23
Section 1203 (a) of the Flammable Fabrics Act expressly preempts
nonidentical state flammability standards. 24 States may adopt stricter
standards for their own use' 2 5 and they may request the Consumer
Product Safety Commission to authorize them to promulgate stricter
standards. 12' Despite this preemptive language, the courts generally
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c); see alsoJames L. Winokur &Jennifer Robbins, Consumer Product
Safety: Preemption, the Commerce Clause and State Regulatory Authority, 25 VILL. L. REv. 232,
247-62 (1979-80) (discussing the CPSA's preemption provision).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
120. See Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHrrrIER
L. REv. 831, 859 (1992) ("There are no reported cases in which a claim of federal preemp-
tion under the Consumer Product Safety Act has been upheld."). But see Moe v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179, 182 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that CPSA expressly preempts fail-
ure-to-warn claim, but not design defect claim, against manufacturer of lawnmower).
121. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (1994).
123. See Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740-41 (4th Cir.) ("To the extent the Plaintiff
seeks warnings that are more elaborate or different from those issued by Congress and
promulgated by CPSC .... those claims are preempted."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999
(1993); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001, 1007-09 (W.D. Pa.
1992) (holding that, if Congress intended to occupy the field of labeling drain cleaning
products, any state claim that would mandate different requirements would be preempted
by federal requirements); Salazar v. Whink Prods. Co., 881 P.2d 431, 434 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995) (finding that FHSA preempts claim against manu-
facturer of rust stain remover based on failure to provide adequate warnings on product's
label). But see Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 949-50 (9th Cir.)
(holding that a state statute requiring "point of sale" warnings for products determined to
be carcinogenic or reproductively toxic does not conflict with FHSA and, therefore, is not
preempted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992);Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d
998, 1005 (Ohio 1994) (holding that an inadequate warning claim is not preempted when
the product warning allegedly failed to meet FHSA requirements); Birch v. Amsterdam
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that FHSA establishes only mini-
mum warning requirements and the Act does not necessarily preclude a finding that an
actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1994).
125. Id. § 1203(b).
126. Id. § 1203(c).
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have allowed injured parties to sue manufacturers who have complied
with FFA flammability standards. 1
27
3. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.-Although
FIFRA permits the states to regulate the sale and use of registered
pesticides,1 2 section 136v(b) declares that no state shall impose "any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different"
from those required by the EPA. 129 At the present time, there is a
split of authority over the preemptive effect of FIFRA,13 0 although
127. See Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that a claim against a manufacturer was not preempted even though the children's
nightwear product complied with FFA flammability standards); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734-35 (Minn.) (holding that a manufacturer of children's pajamas
was liable for punitive damages despite compliance with federal flammability require-
ments), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Feiner v. Calvin Klein, Ltd., 549 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693
(App. Div. 1990) (finding that compliance with the FFA may constitute evidence of due
care but does not preclude a finding of negligence).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1994).
129. Id. § 136v(b).
130. CompareKing v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding that, in light of Cipollone, FIFRA preempts plaintiffs state law tort claims based on
defendant's failure to warn); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir.) (holding that the direct conflict between federal regula-
tion of pesticides and state tort actions based on failure to warn required preemption of
state law), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. CL
314 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
FIFRA has occupied the entire field of pesticide labeling regulation precluding states from
supplementing federal law by means of state common-law tort actions), vacated sub nom.
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.
Supp. 781, 785 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (holding that FIFRA preempts any state tort claims alleg-
ing inadequate labeling or failure to warn); Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp.
799, 811 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that Congress has expressly preempted state law tort
claims based on inadequate labeling); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283,
1289 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims are preempted be-
cause they conflict with the regulatory goals of FIFRA); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F.
Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that any state law tort recovery based on a
failure-to-warn theory would abrogate Congress's intent to provide uniform regulations
governing the labeling of pesticides) with Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529,
1541-43 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that (1) Congress has not explicitly preempted state damage
actions; (2) compliance with both state and federal law cannot be said to be impossible;
and (3) state damage actions do not interfere with FIFRA objectives), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1344
(D. Mont. 1991) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt failure-to-warn claims on actual
conflict grounds); Cox v. Vesicol Chem. Co., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding
that FIFRA does not preempt plaintiff's claims based on inadequate warnings); Roberts v.
Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. I1. 1988) (holding that FIFRA regulation of
pesticides does not preclude state court remedies for a manufacturer's failure to warn).
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most courts since the Cipollone decision have concluded that section
136v(b) of FIFRA preempts inadequate labeling claims."' 1
4. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.--Section 30103(b)
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) de-
clares that no state may establish any motor vehicle safety standard
that is not identical to an applicable federal standard."3 2 At the same
time, however, section 30103(e) provides that "[c]ompliance with any
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) issued under this
subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under com-
mon law."' This has led many courts to conclude that safety stan-
dards issued under NTMVSA do not preempt common-law tort
claims.1 34
131. Cf MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that FIFRA preempts tort claims based on alleged inadequacy of EPA-approved pesticide
warnings); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 369-71 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
common-law actions for labeling and packaging defects are barred under FIFRA); Papas v.
Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1993) ("FIFRA expressly preempts state common-
law claims against manufacturers of EPA-registered pesticides to the extent such actions
are predicated on claims of inadequate labeling or packaging."); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
§ 136v(b) expressly preempts state law tort claims based on inadequate warning); Worm v.
American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the language
of § 136v(b) manifestly preempts common-law duty that would impose liability require-
ments inconsistent with those established by FIFRA); Kinser v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 837 F.
Supp. 217, 219 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (holding that FIFRA preempted state common-law tort
claims based on failure to warn); ISK Biotech Corp. v. Douberly, 640 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that federal courts have generally agreed that FIFRA
preempts all state common-law claims based on inadequate labeling); Hopkins v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 432 S.E.2d 142, 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that FIFRA preempts state
common-law claims based on inadequate labeling); see also R. David Allnutt, Comment,
FFRA Preemption of State Common Law Claims After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68
WASH. L. REV. 859, 869-76 (1993); Stephen D. Otero, Note, The Case Against FFRA Preemp-
tion: Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic No-
tions of Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 823-33 (1995). But see MacDonald v.
Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that FIFRA does not
preempt failure-to-warn claims against pesticide manufacturers).
132. 49 U.S.CA § 30103(b) (West Supp. 1995) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(d)).
133. Id. § 30103(e) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)).
134. Compare Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995) (holding that a
state common-law tort claim based on the failure to equip a truck with antilock brakes was
not preempted by NTMVSA); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 783-86
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding that even though a state common-law tort claim based on inade-
quate lighting equipment may have some negative effect on uniformity, it was not pre-
empted by FMVSS 108); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1980)
(finding that a crashworthiness claim was not preempted despite the company's compli-
ance with applicable federal safety standards), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Welsh v.
Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 321 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that a state common-
law tort claim based on improper design of child restraint system not preempted by FMVSS
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A large number of NTMVSA preemption cases have involved
FMVSS 208, which establishes requirements for active and passive re-
straint systems.' 3 5 FMVSS 208 permits automobile manufacturers to
comply by installing airbags in their vehicles or by installing various
combinations of lapbelts and shoulder harnesses.13 6 Plaintiffs main-
tain that manufacturers must equip their vehicles with airbags if they
are to avoid tort liability, while manufacturers respond that FMVSS
208 preempts such design-defect claims because it allows them to sat-
isfy occupant safety requirements by providing lapbelts and shoulder
harnesses.13 7  Although plaintiffs occasionally have prevailed on this
issue, 38 most courts have held that FMVSS 208 preempts "no airbag"
claims. 13
9
213); Garcia v. Rivera, 541 N.Y.S.2d 880, 889 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1989) (holding that a state
common-law tort claim based on the improper height of truck bumpers was not pre-
empted by federal safety standards) with Myrick v. Fruehauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139, 1143
(N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that FMVSS 121 preempts design-defect claim based on the fail-
ure to provide antilock brakes on truck and trailer rig); Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp.
1135, 1140-41 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that a state design-defect claim based on the failure
to place reflective tape along the sides of a truck was preempted by FMVSS 108); Verna v.
United States Suzuki Motor Corp., 713 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that a
state common-law design-defect claim based on the failure to install modulating headlamp
on a motorcycle was preempted by FMVSS 108).
135. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1994); see also Kurt B. Chadwell, Comment, Automotive Passive
Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An End to the Federal Preemption Defense, 46 BAYLOR L. REN'.
141, 143-53 (1994) (discussing the history and objectives of FMVSS 208).
136. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.S4.1.2.1 to -.3.
137. See Keith C. Miller, Deflating the Airbag Pre-Emption Controversy, 37 EMORy L.J. 897,
911-16 (1988) (discussing the intent of FMVSS 208 and the arguments over which com-
mon-law tort claims should be preempted); Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag"
Tort Claims: Preemption and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 3-7 (1986) (discuss-
ing the history of passive restraint regulation and the NHTSA's preference for mandatory
seat belt laws over mandatory air bag installation to protect passenger safety).
138. See Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407, 411-12 (D. Md. 1987) ("The most
reasonable way to reconcile the language of the NTMVSA does not preempt plaintiff's
common law claims"); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Co., 650 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding that the plaintiff's airbag claim was not preempted because New York common
law did not conflict with federal law); Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 149, 152
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the NTMVSA does not preempt "no airbag" claim
against automobile manufacturer); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 330
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that NTMVSA does not preempt passive restraint claims,
including "no airbag" claims).
139. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that "no airbag" claims would frustrate the regulatory goals of FMVSS 208 and were, ac-
cordingly, preempted); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the NTMVSA preempted plaintiff's airbag claim); Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 419 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that "no airbag" claims were preempted
because they are regulatory in nature), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
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5. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.-Neither the FDCA, nor the
Public Health Services Act (PHSA), contains an express preemption
provision. 4 ° Consequently, if FDA standards are to preempt tort
claims, they must do so on the basis of occupation-of-the-field or con-
flict grounds. In fact, preemption claims have seldom prevailed, at
least where chemical drugs"' or biological products142 were involved.
On the other hand, the courts have been more receptive to preemp-
tion arguments in the case of medical devices. Section 360k(a) of the
Medical Act Amendments expressly limits the power of state and local
governments to impose requirements for medical devices that are li-
censed by the FDA. 143 Furthermore, the FDA has declared that sec-
ton 360k(a)'s preemptive language applies to court decisions as well
140. SeeJennie Clarke, Comment, Federal Preemption: A Vaccine Manufacturer's Defense, 56
UMKC L. REv. 515, 531 (1988).
141. See Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that FDA approval of a labor-inhibiting drug did not preempt design defect
claim); Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that
absent actual conflict between FDA regulations and state tort law, or an intent by Congress
to occupy the entire field, defendant's preemption challenge fails), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1009 (1988); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1981)
(finding that labels drafted by FDA were not conclusory on the adequacy of warnings);
Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that compli-
ance with federal regulations concerning a drug does not by itself absolve a manufacturer
of state tort liability); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (hold-
ing that mere compliance with FDA regulations does not absolve manufacturer of liability);
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 430-31 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding that aspirin
manufacturer's compliance with FDA labeling requirements does not preclude liability for
failure to provide warning in Spanish about risk of Reye's Syndrome); Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 592 A.2d 1176, 1192 (NJ. 1991) (holding that FDA labeling standards do not pre-
empt failure-to-warn claim against manufacturer of tetracycline drug), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 3027 (1992).
142. SeeAbbot exreL Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111-14 (4th Cir.)
(holding that compliance with FDA regulations does not preempt failure-to-warn claim
against manufacturer of DPT vaccine), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988);Jones exrel.Jones v.
Lederle Labs., 695 F. Supp. 700, 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a strict liability claim
against a vaccine manufacturer based on defective design was not preempted by federal
law); McMillan ex rel. Foyle v. Lederle Labs., 674 F. Supp. 530, 532-34 (E.D.N.C. 1987)
(holding that state law claims for injuries caused by DPT vaccine were not preempted by
federal law); Martinkovic ex rel. Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 214
(N.D. II. 1987) (holding that FDA regulations did not preempt state tort claims against
vaccine manufacturers); Graham ex rel. Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491-93
(D. Kan. 1987) (holding that federal regulations did not preempt state tort law claims
against drug manufacturer); Wack v. Lederle Labs., 666 F. Supp. 123, 127 (N.D. Ohio
1987) (holding that FDA approval of "whole cell" DPT vaccine does not preempt design-
defect claim against vaccine manufacturer). But see Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 851 F.2d 1536,
1542 (5th Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that compliance with
FDA-approved labeling immunizes drug manufacturers from tort liability if they provide
the agency with all appropriate information about product risks before it approves the
labeling).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
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as statutory and administrative regulations."' Until recently, this led
many courts to conclude that section 360k(a) expressly preempted
tort claims against manufacturers whose products are licensed under
the MDA.145 However, this interpretation of section 360k(a) has now
been called into question by the Supreme Court's decision this sum-
mer in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.1' In that case, the Court held that
neither manufacturing-defect, design-defect, or failure-to-warn claims
144. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1995).
145. See Martin v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39, 41-42 (6th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that MDA expressly preempts claims against manufacturer of cardiac pacemaker);
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that MDA
preempts claims against manufacturer of intraocular lenses); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb
Co., 65 F.3d 392, 396-98 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that MDA preempts certain claims
against implant manufacturer); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542-45 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that a state common-law tort claim against a manufacturer of an exper-
imental intraocular lens was preempted by MDA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994);
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that negligence and
implied warranty claims against manufacturer of heart pacemaker that were premised on
inadequate warnings were preempted by MDA); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416,
1423-24 (5th Cir.) (holding that the MDA preempts failure-to-warn claim against manufac-
turer of antiwrinkle implants), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983
F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st Cir.) (holding that the MDA preempts implied warranty claim
against manufacturer of andwrinkle implants), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Moore v.
imberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a failure-to-warn claim
against tampon manufacturer was preempted by MDA); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 851 F. Supp.
269, 273 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that a warranty claim against manufacturer of artifi-
cial heart valve was preempted by MDA); Griffin v. Medronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396, 397
(D. Md. 1994) (holding that a design-defect claim against heart pacemaker was preempted
by MDA); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that a failure-to-warn claim against manufacturer of artificial heart valve was pre-
empted by MDA); Cameron v. Howmedica, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 317, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(holding that a design-defect claim against manufacturer of artificial hip was preempted by
MDA); Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding
that a failure-to-warn claim against a tampon manufacturer was preempted by MDA). But
see Parenteau v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.N.H.
1994) (holding that a design-defect claim against manufacturer of knee prothesis was not
preempted because FDA regulation imposed no design standard); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc.,
848 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that MDA does not preempt state law tort
claims based on defectively designed artificial hip implant); Desmarais v. Dow Corning
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989) (holding that a failure-to-warn claim against
manufacturer of silicone breast implants was not preempted when product was implanted
prior to enactment of § 360k); Mitchell v. Iolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 878-79 (E.D. La.
1988) (holding that a claim based on lack of informed consent against manufacturer of
experimental intraocular eye lens was not preempted by MDA); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys.,
Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992) (holding that a breach of warranty claim against
manufacturer of heart pacemaker was not preempted by MDA because FDA had not
promulgated regulations at the time of sale); see also Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal
Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 199-200 (1994) (discussing
recent medical device preemption cases).
146. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
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against the manufacturer of an electronic pacemaker were preempted
by the MDA.' 7
6. Federal Aviation Act.--Section 1305 (a) of the Federal Aviation
Act expressly preempts state laws, regulations, or standards that pur-
port to regulate "rates, routes, or services." 4 ' However, the Act also
contains a savings clause that declares that "[n]othing contained in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now ex-
isting at common law or by statute.. . ."149 This language has per-
suaded the courts to reject arguments by manufacturers that FAA
aircraft safety standards preempt common-law design-defect claims.' 0
7. Occupational Safety and Health Act.-Section 667 of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act prohibits the states from establishing
safety standards in areas where OSHA standards have already been
promulgated.' However, because OSHA safety standards are aimed
at employers, rather than product manufacturers, it has been sug-
gested that the preemptive language of section 667 does not extend to
tort actions brought against manufacturers who comply with OSHA
standards. 15 2
C. A Critique of Preemption Jurisprudence
Court decisions on preemption are inconsistent and appear to
have little predictive value. Thus, manufacturers who believe that fed-
eral safety standards preempt tort liability must engage in lengthy and
expensive litigation in order to obtain an authoritative decision from
147. Id. at 2251-58. It should be noted that the device in question did not undergo
conventional premarket approval by the FDA, but was approved under section 510(k) as a
"substantially equivalent" device. Id. at 2248. In the Court's view, this greatly weakened
the manufacturer's preemption claim since the primary focus of section 510(k) was equiva-
lence to existing devices rather than safety. Id. at 2254.
148. 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
149. Id. § 1506.
150. See Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that an airplane seat design-defect claim was not expressly preempted by FAA regula-
tions); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443-47 (10th Cir.) (holding that a
design-defect claim was not preempted by FAA standards), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291
(1993); Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D. Haw. 1990)
(holding that plaintiffs' crashworthiness claim was not impliedly preempted by FAA regula-
tions); see also Patrick J. Shea, Note, Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages
of Federal Preemption over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REv,. 747, 779-81 (1995).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1994). States may seek permission from OSHA to assume regula-
tory responsibilities that would otherwise be reserved to OSHA. Id. § 667(b), (c).
152. See Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 306 (D.
Minn. 1990) (holding that because OSHA is aimed primarily at employers, and not manu-
facturers of products used by employers, asbestos removal is outside the Act's scope).
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the courts on this issue. This failing greatly reduces the value of the
preemption doctrine as a "safe harbor" for manufacturers whose
products satisfy federal regulatory standards.
The prevailing method of statutory interpretation significantly
contributes to the indeterminacy problem. When courts decide pre-
emption cases they often focus on the concept of "regulatory pur-
pose."153 Unfortunately, this approach is largely circular because the
outcome of the case depends on how the court resolves the "purpose"
question. Thus, in pesticide labeling cases, for example, courts that
conclude that FIFRA's regulatory purpose is to establish uniform la-
beling requirements usually preempt state tort law on conflict
grounds. 54 On the other hand, courts are less likely to preempt tort
claims if they determine that FIFRA is only concerned with the estab-
lishment of "minimum regulatory standards."155
Another problem with preemption analysis is that it requires
courts to make critical findings of fact on the basis of inadequate evi-
dence. For example, a key issue in many preemption cases is whether
damage awards will obstruct a statute's regulatory purpose. Because
reliable information is seldom available, courts are left to speculate
about the effects of possible tort liability on manufacturer behavior.
Inevitably, different assumptions about such behavior lead to different
conclusions about the preemption issue.156
153. See generally Ausness, supra note 6, at 212.
154. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d
158, 160-62 (10th Cir.) (holding that state tort actions based on labeling and alleged fail-
ure to warn are implicitly preempted by FIFRA), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019,
1025-26 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that "FIFRA impliedly preempts state common law tort
suits against manufacturers of EPA-registered pesticides to the extent that such actions are
based on claims of inadequate labeling") (emphasis omitted), vacated sub nom. Papas v.
Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
155. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.) (explain-
ing that while FIFRA does not allow states to apply additional labeling requirements, FIFRA
does allow states to impose more stringent requirements on the use of EPA-approved pesti-
cides), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500,
1508 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (stating that FIFRA establishes minimum standards for pesticide
labeling); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that
Congress likely intended FIFRA to set minimum requirements for pesticide labeling).
156. Compare Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541 (finding for an injured plaintiff after holding that
while the EPA may have approved the defendant's label as consistent with FIFRA, this does
not preclude a jury from finding that the label is inadequate for state tort law purposes)
and Cox, 704 F. Supp. at 87 (finding that Congress did not intend "to preempt the entire
field of pesticide labeling thus immunizing manufacturers from state tort claims alleging
inadequate warnings") with Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 410-12 (1st Cir.
1988) (finding that FMVSS were intended to be national uniform standards and therefore
state regulations would expressly be preempted because they could destroy this uniform-
ity), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990) and Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 807
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As long as federal product safety statutes contain ambiguous pre-
emption provisions, courts will continue to decide preemption claims
without adequate legislative guidance. This is an unsatisfactory situa-
tion for all concerned. Clearly some reform will be necessary before
manufacturers whose products comply with applicable federal safety
standards can rely on federal preemption to protect them against tort
liability.
D. Agency Preemption
Of course, Congress and federal agencies could assume more re-
sponsibility for determining when damage claims based on state tort
law principles are to be preempted. The simplest and most obvious
way to resolve preemption questions would be for Congress to state
explicitly whether compliance with federal safety standards will affect
tort liability for product-related injuries.1 5 7 This action would provide
clear guidance to interested parties and would prevent a good deal of
unnecessary litigation. Unfortunately, Congress has shown little inter-
est in resolving such issues in the past and is unlikely to do so in the
future.
A less desirable, but more realistic, approach would be for each
federal agency to issue an interpretation of its statutory authority to
determine whether it preempts state tort liability. Although such
agency interpretations may not be binding on the courts, 15 8 they are
likely to receive a good deal of deference from the judiciary.'59 The
Food and Drug Administration has already taken such a step with re-
spect to section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments. 6 ' This
provision prohibits the states from establishing any "requirements" for
medical devices that differ from FDA standards.' The FDA has is-
(M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that FIFRA expressly preempts state law regulation of pesticide
labeling).
157. Congress could also include a savings clause expressly preserving state law damage
claims if it wished to limit the preemptive effect of product safety legislation. See, e.g.,
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 4401
(1994).
158. See Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (11th Cir.
1983) ("The weight given the interpretation by the reviewing court 'will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade
....'" (citations omitted)).
159. See New Jersey v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262,
1282 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that great deference should be given to agency
interpretations).
160. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (1994).
161. Id.
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sued a regulation that declares that section 360k(a) preempts state
court decisions as well as statutes, ordinances, and administrative reg-
ulations. 162 In general, the courts have accepted this interpretation of
section 360k(a) as authoritative. 163
Finally, federal agencies can preempt state tort law on their own
initiative. This power, known as administrative preemption, may be
exercised by a federal agency when Congress expressly or impliedly
authorizes it to preempt state law.' 6 4 Although administrative pre-
emption has been used most often to preempt state statutes and ad-
ministrative regulations, it can also be invoked to preempt state
common-law doctrines. 165 Thus, when administrative preemption is
available, a federal agency may expressly preempt state tort law.
E. Concerns About Agency Preemption
Although express preemption of state tort law by Congress or by
federal administrative agencies will provide consistency and clarity,
broad use of federal authority to preempt state tort law also will have a
number of negative consequences. First of all, any sweeping displace-
ment of state tort law by Congress or federal administrative agencies
raises serious federalism concerns. As the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged, the protection of public health and safety are tradition-
ally matters of state and local responsibility.166 Because large-scale
162. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1995).
163. See, e.g., Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that state law claims based on inadequate labeling and warning statements are preempted
by § 360k); Cornelison v. Tambrands, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 706, 709 (D. Minn. 1989) (con-
cluding that § 360k preempts state tort standards that would "impose requirements upon
producers of medical devices which are different from, or in addition to, the requirements
of the Medical Device Amendments"); Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp.
288, 292 (D.NJ. 1988) (stating that Congress and the FDA excluded states from establish-
ing labeling standards for medical devices through § 360k); Rinehart v. International
Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (concluding that § 360k set out the
standard to be applied to labeling requirements and that neither the court nor the jury
may impose additional warning requirements); Lavetter v. International Playtex, Inc., 706
F. Supp. 722, 723 (D. Ariz. 1988) (holding that where defendant's user warning was in
compliance with § 360k plaintiff's claims based on state law were preempted); Edmonson
v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that § 360k
prohibits any additional labeling requirements by the states).
164. See Hoke, supra note 105, at 734; Richardj. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Feder-
alism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Pirr. L. Rv.
607, 636-41 (1985) (discussing federal agency invalidation of state regulatory actions).
165. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,159 (1982) (hold-
ing that regulation issued by Home Loan Bank Board preempted state court decisions
prohibiting "due on sale" clauses in residential mortgages).
166. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985) (declaring that "regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and histori-
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federal preemption of state tort law would impair a state's power to
protect the health and safety of its citizens, it would amount to a seri-
ous infringement on state sovereignty. Obviously, such an intrusion
into traditional areas of state interest should be avoided if possible.
Second, preemption effectively insulates manufacturers of defec-
tive products against tort liability when federal safety standards are
inadequate or obsolete. Unfortunately, federal labeling and design
requirements are sometimes the product of political compromises, 16 7
excessive influence within the agency by the regulated industry,16 or
excessive dependence upon industry sources for necessary informa-
tion. 169 Tort liability offsets these flaws in the regulatory process by
encouraging manufacturers to exceed federal safety requirements
when it is cost-effective to do so. This incentive will be foreclosed if
state tort claims are preempted by agency action.
Finally, federal preemption strips injured parties of their state law
remedies. Imposing tort liability on the manufacturers of defective
products shifts the costs of accidents from individuals to the manufac-
turers who can spread liability costs to consumers through the pricing
mechanism. 17' This loss-spreading effect of products liability pro-
motes social welfare by reducing "secondary" accident costs. 17' How-
ever, these benefits are lost when federal preemption relieves a
manufacturer of its duty to compensate accident victims.
cally, a matter of local concern"); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428
(1963) (stating that regulations to protect public health and welfare fall within historic
powers of the states).
167. See Anita Johnson, Products Liability "Reform". A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. Rv.
677, 687 (1978) ("Manufacturers have enormous power to influence the formation of gov-
ernment standards, with the result that the standards are frequently political compromises
at best."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New
Administrative Law, 98 YALE LJ. 341, 363 (1988) ("Overall, rulemaking priorities seem
guided more by political than by cost-effectiveness criteria.").
168. See Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. Rv.
1027, 1065-69 (1990) (describing the phenomenon of industry capture of an agency);Jerry
L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALEJ. ON REG. 257, 270 (1987) (discussing a beneficial regulatory scheme for an industry
maintained by "reelection-oriented legislators").
169. See Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Ac-
tions, 41 VAND. L. Rav. 1121, 1147 (1988) ("Industry often controls indispensable data
about the nature and extent of the safety problem that an agency is attempting to address,
as well as information about the technology and costs of reducing or eliminating the
risk.").
170. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855, 856 (1963) (stating that there is wide acceptance of the theory
that large corporations should pass on to general users the losses of the few).
171. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
LJ. 499, 517-18 (1961) (proposing that losses are least harmful if broadly spread).
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IV. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AS A DEFENSE
The regulatory compliance defense appears to be a promising al-
ternative to preemption. This defense offers manufacturers who com-
ply with product safety standards some protection against tort liability.
Unfortunately, in its present form, the regulatory compliance defense
is too weak to provide much of a safe harbor to product sellers. At the
present time, most courts treat failure to comply with applicable gov-
ernment safety standards as conclusive evidence of negligence; how-
ever, they usually regard compliance with such standards as nothing
more than evidence of due care.17 Apparently, these courts do not
believe that government safety standards should be the exclusive mea-
sure of product quality.1
73
A. Compliance Versus Noncompliance with Regulatory Standards
In most jurisdictions, unexcused violations of state statutes are
treated as negligence per se.174 The concept of negligence per se as-
sumes that the legislature has established a mandatory standard of
civil conduct when it enacts a criminal or regulatory statute. 175 There-
fore, one who violates a statute may justifiably be held liable in tort
even though the statute makes no express provision for civil liabil-
ity.' 71 Violations of municipal ordinances also constitute negligence
172. See Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1136 ("[C]ourts have ruled, in general, that non-
compliance with statutory and regulatory standards constitutes negligence per se, or is pre-
sumptive of negligence, while compliance constitutes relevant evidence of due care, but
deserves no special weight.").
173. See Teresa M. Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv.
1335, 134243 (1993) (stating that courts often consider regulatory standards as minimum
standards of safety and therefore not "equivalent to the standards of safety required by tort
law").
174. See Teal v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that a breach of a duty imposed by OSHA is negligence per se if the plaintiff is a
member of the class intended to be protected by the regulation); Eaton v. Eaton, 575 A.2d
858, 865-66 (N.J. 1990) (holding that, when a statute prohibited careless driving, "proof of
the violation of the statute is proof of negligence itself"); Gressman v. McClain, 533 N.E.2d
732, 735 (Ohio 1988) (concluding that selling liquor to an intoxicated person violates a
duty imposed by the law and thus constitutes negligence per se); McIntyre v. Balentine,
833 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tenn. 1992) ("[V]iolation of a penal statute is negligence per se. ... ").
175. See Staudinger v. Barrett, 544 A.2d 164, 167 (Conn. 1988) ("The doctrine of negli-
gence per se serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general
standard of care."); Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.
1979) ("Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively imposed standard of
conduct is adopted by the civil courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent
person.").
176. See Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 676 (Alaska 1981) (holding that a statute
prohibiting the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons subjects violator to civil liability);
Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098, 1107 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the breach of a
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per se, 177 although some jurisdictions merely consider such violations
to be evidence of negligence. 178 Violations of administrative regula-
tions are also usually viewed as negligence per se, 1 79 although some
states treat such violations more leniently.1 80
The concept of negligence per se is applicable to products liabil-
ity. Consequently, a product manufacturer may be held civilly liable
as a matter of law for injuries caused by its failure to comply with ap-
plicable safety standards.' It should be noted, however, that some
statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person may be relied upon to
establish the breach of a legally owed duty for a negligence suit).
177. See Stephens v. Steams, 678 P.2d 41, 48-49 (Idaho 1984) (holding that the violation
of a building code constituted negligence per se); Brichacek v. Hiskey, 401 N.W.2d 44, 46-
47 (Iowa 1987) (holding that the violation of a housing code can be used as the basis for a
tort action); Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 618 (Okla. 1980) (holding
that a violation of an ordinance requiring a gas company to check valves before turning on
gas was negligence per se); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549
(Tex. 1985) (holding that a violation of a requirement to keep premises secure against
unauthorized entry, without a valid excuse, is per se negligence).
178. See Cassibo v. Bodwin, 386 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a
violation of a dog leash ordinance "is only evidence of negligence"); Keyes v. Amundson,
391 N.W.2d 602, 608 (N.D. 1986) (finding that a violation of a "no parking" ordinance may
be considered evidence of negligence); Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981)
(stating that a violation of a municipal housing code "is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence"); Crago v. Lurie, 273 S.E.2d 344, 345-46 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding that a violation
of a sidewalk maintenance ordinance "constituted prima facie actionable negligence when
it was the proximate cause of any injury").
179. See Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Ky. 1991) (stating that a violation of an
administrative regulation prohibiting the accumulation of trash near buildings constitutes
negligence per se); Hyatt v. Sellen Constr. Co., 700 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that a violation of state department of labor worker-safety regulations could consti-
tute negligence per se).
180. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1519, 1542 (N.D. Ind. 1991)
(stating that a violation of a reporting requirement for toxic chemical spills is only evi-
dence of negligence in Indiana), affd in part and rv'd in part, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 356 N.E.2d 93, 97-98 (Ill.
1976) (finding that a violation of a regulation requiring a competent person to be present
during the loading and unloading of gasoline tank trucks should be considered prima
facie evidence of negligence); Haselhorst v. State, 485 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Neb. 1992) (stat-
ing that a violation of the requirements for the placement of foster children is evidence of
negligence).
181. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding
that a violation of FDA labeling requirements by a manufacturer of surgical nails is negli-
gence per se); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D.
Wis. 1981) (holding that the failure to comply with FDA warning requirements for oral
contraceptives could be negligence per se); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630,
634 (Cal. 1984) (finding that the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on negligence per
se if the aircraft manufacturer failed to comply with FAA regulations), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1110 (1985); see also Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1135-36 (stating that courts have generally
found regulatory standards to give the minimum standard of care required).
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courts conclude that noncompliance merely creates a presumption of
negligence.182
Courts treat compliance with government safety standards some-
what differently than they treat noncompliance with such standards.
Section 288C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that compli-
ance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does
not preclude a finding of negligence in cases where a reasonable per-
son would take additional precautions.' 8 3 Most states appear to follow
the Restatement's approach in negligence cases. Thus, compliance with
safety regulations is generally considered to be some evidence of due
care,184 but it is seldom conclusive. 185
B. Effect of Compliance with Federal Product Safety Standards
Ordinarily, regulatory compliance is treated the same in product
liability cases as it is in negligence cases. Although there are some
exceptions, 186 most courts agree that federal safety regulations are rel-
evant evidence in products liability cases.187 On the other hand, few
courts are willing to give much weight to such statutes. Instead, most
182. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 408-09 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding that the violation of the labeling and marketing provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act creates a presumption of negligence); Batteast v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 560
N.E.2d 315, 323 (Ill. 1990) (stating that an Aminophylline manufacturer's failure to com-
ply with FDA warning requirements would be prima facie evidence of negligence if the
violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff was a member of
the class intended to be protected by the regulation).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
184. See Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920,
924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that defendant's compliance with safety glass require-
ments was admissible to show lack of negligence).
185. See Pickering v. State, 557 P.2d 125, 127 (Haw. 1976) ("[C]ompliance with estab-
lished statutory and administrative standards are [sic] not necessarily conclusive on the
issue of negligence."); Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Servs., Inc., 424 A.2d 336, 340 (Md. 1981)
("'Compliance with a legislative enactment ... does not prevent a finding of negligence
... '" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965))); Miller v. Warren, 390
S.E.2d 207, 209 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that a motel's compliance with the fire code, while
relevant, is not conclusive evidence of due care).
186. See McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (1st Cir. 1981) (determining that
OSHA regulations requiring circular saws to have blade guards is not admissible because
they applied to industrial, not consumer, use); Sheehan v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 555 A.2d
1352, 1354-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing
to admit evidence that OSHA standards required employers, not manufacturers, to place
safety guards on shearing machines).
187. See Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 N.E.2d 575, 577-78 (Ill. 1982) (finding
federal safety standards relating to rear seat anchoring system admissible by manufacturer
as evidence that design was not defective); Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 396 N.E.2d
534, 536-37 (Ill. 1979) (holding that in this design-defect case the defendant was allowed to
submit evidence of his compliance with federal standards of construction for railroad tank
cars); Hatfield v. Sandoz-Wander, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984) (holding
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have concluded that compliance with federal safety standards is
merely evidence that a product is not defective, effectively allowing
juries to substitute their judgment for that of a regulatory agency."' 8
1. Flammable Fabric Act.-A number of courts have held that
compliance with the flammability standards of the Flammable Fabric
Act does not necessarily protect manufacturers against tort actions by
injured consumers."8 9 Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp.190 is illustrative.
In Raymond, a child was burned when her nightgown came into con-
tact with an electric grill. 19 1 The trial court, acting without a jury,
found in favor of the plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the manu-
facturer had complied with applicable flammability standards."19 On
appeal, the federal appeals court agreed that federal safety standards
were not conclusive on the issue of defectiveness.1 93 The court cited
the Restatement (Second) of Torts 94 for the proposition that standards
that a defendant may introduce evidence that the prescription drug, Mellaril, was ap-
proved by the FDA to support its claim that its package insert labeling was adequate).
188. See Shorter v. Champion Home Builders Co., 776 F. Supp. 333, 338 (N.D. Ohio
1991) (holding that compliance with the National Manufactured Housing Construction
and Safety Standards Act was not conclusive on the issue of whether a mobile home that
had formaldehyde in its flooring was defectively designed); Biasing v. P.R.L. Hardenbergh
Co., 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. 1975) (holding that compliance by a manufacturer of
flammable liquid finish remover with federal warning requirements was not conclusive on
issue of due care); Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 490 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (App. Div. 1985)
(stating that compliance with federal labeling standards for industrial strength acid was not
conclusive on the issue of due care); see also Spradley, supra note 7, at 367 ("[C] ompliance
with governmental design standards, rules, and regulations constitutes some evidence of
the adequacy of the product's design, but is not conclusive.").
189. See Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133, 138 n.9 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
manufacturer's compliance with the Flammable Fabrics Act was relevant in determining
whether the bathrobe at issue was "unreasonably dangerous for use as clothing," but not
conclusive on the issue); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1st Cir.
1973) (holding that compliance with the Flammable Fabrics Act does not bar a strict liabil-
ity claim against the manufacturer); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734-35
(Minn.) (concluding that compliance with federal flammability standards by a manufac-
turer of children's pajamas does not preclude liability for punitive damages), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 921 (1980); Feiner v. Calvin Klein, Ltd., 549 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694 (App. Div. 1990)
(holding that compliance with the Flammable Fabric Act may constitute some evidence of
due care, but is not conclusive); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142,
143-44 (App. Div. 1967) ("While a defendant's compliance with a statute 'is some evidence
of the exercise of due care' it does not preclude a conclusion that he was negligent." (cita-
tions omitted)).
190. 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973).
191. Id. at 1026.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1028.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
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established by criminal statutes are not necessarily controlling in civil
litigation. '95
2. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.--Courts that
reject preemption generally conclude that compliance with FIFRA is
nothing more than weak evidence that conforming pesticide warnings
are adequate. 196 Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.'97 is the leading case.
In Ferebee, an agricultural worker brought suit against an herbicide
manufacturer, alleging injury from long-term occupational exposure
to paraquat.'98 The plaintiff claimed that the labeling was defective
because it failed to warn that long-term exposure to paraquat could
cause serious lung disease.' 99 Rejecting the manufacturer's preemp-
tion argument, the court observed that "mere compliance with [fed-
eral or state] regulatory labeling requirements does not preclude a
jury from] finding that additional warnings should have been
given."200
3. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.-A number of
courts have concluded that compliance with federal motor vehicle
safety standards does not foreclose tort liability.2" 1 Dawson v. Chrysler
195. Raymond, 484 F.2d at 1028.
196. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
the jury could still find the pesticide warnings inadequate, despite compliance with
FIFRA), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128,
1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that compliance with FIFRA does not immunize a man-
ufacturer from state tort liability); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (concluding that, because "[t]he purposes of FIFRA and state tort law may be
quite distinct," a court may find that a pesticide label adequate under FIFRA is not ade-
quate under state tort law).
197. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
198. Id. at 1531-32 (explaining that paraquat is an agricultural herbicide sold under
extensive regulation).
199. Id. at 1532.
200. Id. at 1542 (quoting from Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C.
1976)).
201. See Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1517 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
that federal motor vehicle safety standards do not immunize manufacturer from common-
law liability); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding
that compliance with federal regulations does not exempt a party from liability under com-
mon law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 580 (1982); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating that compliance with motor vehicle safety standards does not relieve a man-
ufacturer of tort liability), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
650 F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that Congress has expressly intended to
preserve common-law remedies and thus compliance with federal regulations does not
cause exemption from common-law liability); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d
1176, 1198 (Ala. 1985) (noting that compliance with federal highway safety standards is not
conclusive and does not provide a defense to state tort law claims); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-
Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding that compliance with
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Corp. 202 is illustrative. In Dawson, the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant's automobile was designed defectively because it did not have a
continuous steel frame.2 °3 Chrysler maintained that its design was ad-
equate because it complied with applicable federal safety standards.20 4
The court, however, relied upon a provision of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which expressly preserved tort claims
against automobile manufacturers.2 0 5 In the court's view, this author-
ized tort liability even though manufacturers complied with motor ve-
hicle safety standards.206
Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co.207 involved a claim for punitive damages
by the owner of a subcompact automobile who was injured when his
vehicle collided with a larger car.208 The trial court concluded that
compliance with federal motor vehicle standards precluded an award
of punitive damages because it negated the element of recklessness as
a matter of law.20 9 The court of appeals observed, however, that the
NTMVSA expressly preserved common-law tort claims. 10 The Dorsey
court also relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to conclude that
"compliance with regulatory standards. .. does not require ajury to
find a defendant's conduct reasonable." 21 1 If compliance with a fed-
eral regulatory standard did not automatically cause defendant's con-
duct to be considered reasonable, the court reasoned that it could be
reckless, thereby justifying an award of punitive damages. 12
4. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.-Compliance with FDA stan-
dards is seldom conclusive on the issue of defectiveness.21 3 In Mac-
federal motor vehicle safety standards does not "shield the manufacturer from common
law liability"). But see Hurt v. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1977)
(holding that a lap belt that complied with motor vehicle safety standards was not
defective).
202. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
203. Id. at 954.
204. Id. at 957.
205. Id. at 958.
206. Id.
207. 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
208. Id. at 652-53.
209. Id. at 656.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965)).
212. Id.
213. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981) (find-
ing that FDA approval of the warning on oral contraceptive pills is not conclusive); Salmon
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding that compliance by a
manufacturer of chloramphenicol with FDA labeling requirements was not conclusive on
the duty-to-warn issue); Martinkovic ex reL Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp.
212, 217 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (concluding that DPT vaccine manufacturer's compliance with
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Donald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,214 for example, the manufacturer
of an oral contraceptive drug issued an FDA-approved booklet in or-
der to warn users about the health risks of taking birth control pills. 2 15
Among other things, the booklet warned about the risk of blood clots,
but failed to use the word "stroke."216 Concluding that the warning
was inadequate, the court declared that "compliance with FDA re-
quirements, though admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence, is
not conclusive on this issue, just as violation of FDA requirements is
evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of negligence."2 1 7
A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Graham v.
Wyeth Laboratories. 8 In that case, parents whose infant daughter suf-
fered brain damage after being vaccinated with DPT vaccine, brought
suit against the manufacturer. 21 9 The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,
that the manufacturer failed to warn about the risk of a severe reac-
tion from the vaccine.22 0 The defendant requested the court to find it
"non-negligent per se" because the warning given had been approved
FDA licensing requirements "is but one factor for the jury to consider in deciding the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct"); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp.
1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (stating that FDA certification of DPT vaccine is not conclusive
of the drug manufacturer's reasonableness); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp.
377, 383 (D. Md. 1975) (stating that compliance with FDA labeling requirements is not
necessarily conclusive on the question of the adequacy of other warnings in failure-to-warn
suit against manufacturer of oral contraceptives), affd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Ste-
vens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (stating that compliance with FDA
labeling requirements by manufacturer of chloramphenicol is not conclusive on issue of
whether the warning was adequate); Malek v. Lederle Labs., 466 N.E.2d 1038, 1039-40 (Ill.
1984) (stating that evidence of compliance with federal regulations is relevant for the con-
sideration of a product's dangerousness but it is not conclusive as to that issue), judgment
reaffd, 504 N.E.2d 893 (1987); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541,
554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (determining that an oral contraceptive manufacturer's compli-
ance with FDA labeling requirements did not make the warning adequate as a matter of
law); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass.) (determin-
ing that compliance with federal regulations does not establish a lack of negligence), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176, 1197 (NJ. 1991)
(holding that civil tort liability is not precluded because of a conflict with federal law);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534-35 (Or. 1974) (holding that a
manufacturer's compliance with FDA warning requirements was not conclusive in negli-
gence action); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978) (holding
that a manufacturer of an antibiotic was liable for failure to warn despite compliance with
FDA labeling requirements).
214. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
215. Id. at 66-67.
216. Id. at 67.
217. Id. at 70-71.
218. 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987).
219. Id. at 1485.
220. Id.
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by the FDA.22 1 The court, however, declared that FDA standards were
nothing more than "minimum standards," which the jury could con-
sider, but which were not dispositive.222
5. Federal Aviation Act.-In general, the courts have refused to
treat compliance with FAA regulations as conclusive evidence that an
aircraft is properly designed.223 Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.224 in-
volved a suit against the manufacturer of a Piper Cherokee by the per-
sonal representatives of two passengers who were killed when the
airplane crashed.225 The plaintiffs alleged that the airplane lost power
when its carburetors iced up.22 6 They claimed, inter alia, that the air-
craft was defective because the manufacturer had failed to install a
fuel injection system.22 7 On appeal from a jury verdict for the plain-
tiffs, 228 the defendant contended that FAA approval of the airplane's
design foreclosed any further inquiry into the safety of its design. 2 9
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, observed that the Federal Avia-
tion Act itself provided that FAA design standards were "minimum
standards only."
23 0
6. Occupational Safety and Health Act.-Although most courts ad-
mit evidence of OSHA standards in product liability cases,231 compli-
221. Id. at 1499.
222. Id.
223. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976) (concluding
that "[c]ompliance with governmental air-safety regulations is admissible, but not conclu-
sive" in determining negligence); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630, 635-36
(Cal. 1984) (finding that a manufacturer may be found liable for "defective design even if
the airplane complies with every regulation"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985); Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Or. 1978) (finding that FAA approval of an
aircraft is not a complete defense to civil liability for faulty design); Berkebile v. Brandy
Helicopter Corp., 281 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (concluding that compliance
with FAA regulations does not establish that due care was exercised).
224. 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).
225. Id. at 1324.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1324-25 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1988)).
231. SeeTurneyv. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (hold-
ing that the defendant would be allowed to introduce evidence that OSHA regulations did
not require the installation of a roll bar on a tractor); Hansen v. Abrasive Engineering &
Mfg., Inc., 831 P.2d 693, 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court's exclusion of
OSHA standards in an action involving the design of sander), affd in part and rev'd in par
856 P.2d 625 (Or. 1993). But see McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 275 (lst Cir. 1981)
(holding that OSHA regulations on circular saws for industrial use are not admissible in a
case involving a saw designed for consumer use).
1246 [VOL. 55:1210
A "STRONG" REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
ance with OSHA safety standards has not precluded a jury from
finding that a product is defective.23 2 McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.2 33 is
one of the few cases to address this issue. In McCullock, a book bindery
employee brought suit against the manufacturer of hot melt glue, ar-
guing that the manufacturer failed to warn her of the risks of expo-
sure to glue fumes in an unventilated area.2 34 The manufacturer
sought immunity from liability on the grounds that it had complied
with applicable OSHA warning requirements. 23 5 The federal court of
appeals, however, concluded that a warning that complied with OSHA
safety standards might still be inadequate.
23 6
C. Precedents for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense
The traditional regulatory compliance defense provides little or
no protection to defendants whose products meet applicable federal
safety standards. The discussion below examines some of the efforts
that have been made in the past to strengthen the legal effect of com-
pliance with regulatory standards.
1. Model Acts.-Several uniform or model acts have included a
strong regulatory compliance defense. The proposals suggested by
Professor James Henderson and the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act are especially noteworthy in this regard.
a. The Henderson Proposal.-In 1978 Professor James Hen-
derson drafted a proposed federal statute to reform and rationalize
design-defect litigation.23 7 One section of the Henderson proposal
provided that a manufacturer would avoid liability under certain cir-
cumstances for design of a product that complied with federal stan-
dards.2 8 In such cases, the plaintiff was required to prove by clear
232. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1992).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 656-57.
235. Id. at 658.
236. Id.
237. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 630.
238. Id. at 632. This provision declares that:
In any products liability action, a defendant shall not be liable for negligence in
the formulation or design of a product if the defendant proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the product formula or design complied with
mandatory standards or regulations adopted by the federal government which
were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and which pertained
directly to the formula or design-related hazard of which the plaintiff complains,
unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence, in addition to other
facts required to be proved under state or federal law, including other provisions
of this Act, that the mandatory federal standards or regulations applicable to the
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and convincing evidence that the standards in question were inade-
quate to protect against unreasonable risks of injury or damage. 3 9
b. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act.--In 1976 a Federal
Interagency Task Force on Products Liability was created to study
problems in the liability insurance industry.2 40 After consulting with
ten federal agencies, the Task Force issued a comprehensive report in
1977.41 One of the Task Force's recommendations was that compli-
ance with federal standards should give rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion that a product manufacturer acted reasonably.24 2 The Task Force
study led to the publication of a Model Uniform Product Liability Act
(MUPLA) by the Department of Commerce in 1979.4 s
Section 107 of MUPLA permits a defendant to request that the
trial court determine whether the product conformed to an adminis-
trative or legislative standard that has the following characteristics:
(1) the standard reflects the results of a thorough product testing and
safety evaluation; (2) the agency considered consumer interests in for-
mulating the standard; (3) the standard is regarded as more than a
minimum standard; and (4) the standard reflects the level of techno-
logical and scientific knowledge reasonably available at the time the
product was manufactured. 2 " If the trial court concludes that the
product meets such a standard, it must instruct the jury to presume
that the product was not defective.2 45 This presumption may only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the risks of the prod-
uct outweighed its utility.246
2. Federal Legislative Proposals.-Many legislative tort reform pro-
posals have provided for an enhanced regulatory compliance defense.
product were inadequate to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a
member from unreasonable risks of injury or damage.
Id.
239. Id.
240. See Rodman Elfin, Product Liability Law Reform: A Critique of Proposed Federal Legisla-
tion, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 579, 579.
241. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCy TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LAaiLrrY, FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE]. The Task Force identified three
areas of concern: the subjective nature of insurance ratemaking practices; unsafe prod-
ucts; and the effect of uncertainties in tort litigation on product liability insurance rates.
For a detailed discussion of this report, see Coccia, supra note 90, at 105-08.
242. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at VIII-40 to VIII-42.
243. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCt LIABILrry ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (proposed Oct. 31,
1979).
244. Id. § 107.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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As early as 1977, a legislative proposal declared that manufacturers
who complied with federal product safety standards would have a de-
fense to damage claims from injured consumers.2 47 This bill was sent
to committee, but no further action was taken. 2" Another bill, intro-
duced in the House of Representatives during that same year, pro-
vided for a rebuttable presumption that a product was not negligently
or defectively designed if its manufacturer complied with applicable
federal or state standards.149 This bill was not reported out of com-
mittee either.2 50
A number of products liability reform proposals were introduced
in the 1980s. 251 Senate Bill 1999, introduced by Senator Danforth in
1985,52 contained a regulatory compliance defense to punitive dam-
ages but did not purport to extend this defense to compensatory dam-
age claims.25 Senator Danforth introduced Senate Bill 2760 in
247. S. 403, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1977). For a discussion of this proposal, see
Sheila I. Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14
FORUM 251, 260-63 (1978) (describing the National Product Liability Insurance Act's aim
at providing several defenses to product liability claims that were either "abolished or lim-
ited by recent case law" and preserving other existing defenses).
248. Victor E. Schwartz, Federal Action on Products Liability-What Has Occurred and What
May Occur, 14 FORUM 287, 299 (1978).
249. H.R. 6300, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 8(a)(3) (1977); see also Birnbaum, supra note 247,
at 265-68 (discussing the provisions of H.R. 6300).
250. Coccia, supra note 90, at 108 n.21. A similar bill, H.R. 5626, was again introduced
in the House in 1979. Id. at 108 n.23 (noting H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979)).
H.R. 5626 is reprinted in Product Liability: Legislative Hearings: Supplemental Hearings on
H.R. 5626 and H.R. 7000 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-22 (1980). This bill also
established government regulations as the appropriate standard of care in design-defect
litigation. Id. § 5(d). Once again, however, no action was taken in committee. 125 CONG.
REc. INDEX 2239 (1979-80).
251. The first of these bills was introduced by Senator Kasten in 1982. See S. 2631, 97th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1981). The Kasten bill attempted to strengthen some of the defenses
available to product manufacturers, but did not contain a regulatory compliance defense.
See Coccia, supra note 90, at 111. The bill was reported out of committee, but was not voted
on by the full Senate. Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue,
in TORT LAw AND THE PUBUC INTEREST, supra note 66, at 247, 257. Senator Kasten reintro-
duced the bill in 1983. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Extensive hearings were
held during 1983 and 1984, but no vote was taken. See Elfin, supra note 240, at 581. A
similar bill was also introduced in 1985. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). However,
this bill was also rejected in committee. Lipsen, supra, at 257. Meanwhile, in October
1982, Representative Shumway introduced a products liability reform bill in the House. See
H.R. 7284, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Unlike the Kasten bill, the Shumway proposal
provided that compliance with government standards would give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the product was safe. Id. § 7(a)(2). However, this bill failed to reach the
House floor.
252. S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
253. Id. § 306(c); see alsoJoseph A. Mahoney, Note, Senate Bill 640: Proposed Federal Prod-
uct Liability Reform and Its Potential Effect on Pharmaceutical Cases and Punitive Damages Claims,
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1986.254 This bill retained the provision that allowed drug manufac-
turers to avoid liability for punitive damages if they complied with
FDA regulatory standards. 255 The bill was reported out of committee
in 1986, but filibuster threats prevented a vote by the full Senate.25
Several years later, Senator Kasten introduced Senate Bill 640, a
revised version of a bill he had introduced in 1981.257 This bill pro-
hibited punitive damage claims against drug manufacturers whose
products were licensed by the FDA, as well as punitive damage claims
against aircraft manufacturers whose products complied with FAA air-
worthiness standards.258 Although the bill reached the Senate floor,
in 1992 it fell victim to a filibuster and was not voted upon by the full
Senate. 25
9
In 1993 Senators Rockefeller, Danforth, and others introduced
Senate Bill 687.260 This bill prohibited punitive damage awards
against manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices if the
drug or device was subject to FDA premarket approval 26 1 or if it was
"generally recognized as safe and effective pursuant to conditions es-
tablished by the FDA and applicable regulations, including packaging
and labeling regulations."262 In addition, the bill exempted aircraft
36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 475, 504 (1992) ("Interestingly, S. 1999 was the first proposal to con-
tain a government standards defense to punitive damage claims.").
254. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in Product Liability Reform Act: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-45 (1986). S. 2760 was a
revised version of the Kasten bill. See supra note 251 (describing the Kasten bill).
255. S. 2760 § 303(c)(1).
256. Lipsen, supra note 251, at 258-59. No significant legislation was introduced in the
Senate during the 100th Congress, which met during 1987 and 1988. See S. REP. No. 356,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990). However, proposed legislation was introduced in the
House. Id.; see, e.g., H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). This bill contained a provi-
sion that protected manufacturers who complied with government standards against liabil-
ity for punitive damages. However, like S. 2760, this legislative proposal was not acted
upon. See Mahoney, supra note 253, at 505.
257. S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. Rac. S3256-60 (1991); see
also supra note 251 (describing the earlier bill). For an analysis of S. 640, see Robert A.
Goodman, Note, Proposed Federal Standards for Product Liability, 30 HARv. J. ON LEcis. 253,
305-318 (1993) (discussing the provisions of the bill, policy arguments surrounding tort
reform proposals, and concluding that tort reform is better addressed at the state level).
See also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANsP., REPORT ON S. 640, S. REP. No.
215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
258. S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(c) (1991). For a discussion of this provision, see
Mahoney, supra note 253, at 511-14.
259. Goodman, supra note 257, at 299.
260. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). A companion bill, H.R. 1910, was introduced
in the House by Representative Rowland and others. For a discussion of S. 687, see M.
Stuart Madden, Recent Federal and American Law Institute Products Liability Reform Initiatives,
29 A.B.A. TORT & INS. LJ. 569, 570-75 (1994).
261. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 203(b) (1) (A) (1993).
262. Id. § 203(b)(1)(B).
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manufacturers from liability for punitive damages if they received FAA
certification and complied with postapproval reporting require-
ments.26 ' Like its predecessors, Senate Bill 687 was not enacted into
law.
Proposed legislation was introduced in the 104th Congress in
1995 as part of the Republican "Contract with America." However,
neither House Bill 10,264 nor its successor, House Bill 956,265 con-
tained a regulatory compliance provision.
3. State Legislation.--Many state statutes now allow or require
courts to consider the effect of compliance with government safety
standards. However, the procedural consequences of such compli-
ance vary considerably from state to state. For example, statutes en-
acted in Arkansas, 266 Michigan, 267 and Washington 261 permit parties
to introduce evidence of regulatory compliance to show that a prod-
uct is not defective or that its warnings are not inadequate; however,
these statutes do not assign any particular evidentiary weight to com-
pliance with safety standards. Other statutes provide that compliance
with government safety regulations creates a rebuttable presumption
that a product is not defective. Colorado, 269 Kansas, 270 Kentucky,
2 71
263. Id. § 203(c).
264. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
265. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
266. Amu. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (Michie 1987). This statute provides:
Compliance by a manufacturer or supplier with any federal or state statute or
administrative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and
prescribing standards of design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warn-
ing, or instructions for the use of a product shall be considered as evidence that
the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to matters
covered by these standards.
Id.
267. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(2) (West 1986). This statute declares:
It shall be admissible in evidence in a products liability action that the manufac-
ture, construction, design, formula, development of standards, preparation,
processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing,
marketing, advertising, packaging, or labeling was done pursuant to the federal
and state laws, rules, or regulations in effect at the time the product was sold or
delivered by the defendant to the initial purchaser or user.
Id.
268. WASH. REa. CODE § 7.72.050(1) (1992). This statute sets forth that "[e]vidence...
that a product was or was not in compliance with ... legislative regulatory standards or
administrative regulatory standards, whether relating to design, construction or perform-
ance of the product or to warnings or instructions as to its use may be considered by the
trier of fact." Id.
269. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (1989). This statute declares that
it shall be rebuttabably presumed that the product which caused the injury,
death, or property damage was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller
thereof was not negligent if the product: ... [clomplied with, at the time of sale
1251
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Tennessee, 27 2 and Utah 27" have chosen this approach. New Jersey
also allows a rebuttable presumption for regulatory compliance, but
limits it to warnings approved or prescribed by the FDA for drugs,
medical devices, food, or food additives.274
Other states have adopted more limited forms of regulatory com-
pliance legislation. For example, five states have enacted statutes that
provide immunity from punitive damage liability to drug manufactur-
by the manufacturer, any applicable code, standard, or regulation adopted or
promulgated by the United States or by this state, or by any agency of the United
States or of this state.
Id.
270. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1994). This statute provides:
When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in
compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory
safety standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed
not defective by reason of design or performance, or, if the standard addressed
warnings or instructions, the product shall be deemed not defective by reason of
warnings or instructions, unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that a reasonably prudent product seller could and would have taken
additional precautions.
Id.
271. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1995). This statute declares:
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to the contrary, that the product was not defective if the
design, methods of manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally recog-
nized and prevailing standards . . . in existence at the time the design was pre-
pared, and the product was manufactured.
Id.
272. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980). This statute sets forth that
[c]ompliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or ad-
ministrative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and pre-
scribing standards for design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning
or instructions for use of a product, shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the
product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to matters cov-
ered by these standards.
Id.
273. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1992). This statute states:
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any defect or defec-
tive condition where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the prod-
uct were in conformity with government standards established for that industry
which were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the product or the
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product
were adopted.
Id.
274. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-4 (West 1987). According to this statute, "[i]f the warn-
ing or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or food or food additive has
been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration .... a rebutta-
ble presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate." Id.
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ers whose products are approved or licensed by the FDA.275 These
statutes declare that the manufacturer or seller of a drug shall not be
held liable for punitive damages if the drug that allegedly caused the
harm was manufactured and labeled in accordance with the terms of
an approval or license issued by the FDA or is generally recognized as
safe and effective pursuant to conditions established by the FDA and
applicable regulations, including packaging and labeling regula-
tions.2 76 These statutes also provide that the regulatory compliance
defense will not apply if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant, either before or after making the drug
available for public use, knowingly, and in violation of applicable FDA
regulations, withheld from or misrepresented information known to
be material and relevant to the harm that the plaintiff allegedly
suffered.277
D. A Proposed Regulatory Compliance Defense
Although some of the measures discussed above are useful ap-
proaches, they do not go far enough. To be truly effective, a regula-
tory compliance defense must fully protect manufacturers from
liability when their products meet applicable federal design, testing,
or labeling requirements. It must also provide immunity to manufac-
turers whose products have satisfied federal requirements for
premarket licensing or approval. With these considerations in mind, I
propose that the following statute be enacted for use in federal
courts:
2 7 8
(1) No product seller shall be liable for any injury to a
claimant allegedly caused by some aspect of the formulation,
labeling, or design of a product if the product seller proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the product's
formula, labeling, or design complied with mandatory safety
standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by an
agency of the federal government, which were applicable to
the product at the time of manufacture, and which governed
the product risk that caused harm, unless the claimant
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the mandatory
275. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (A) (1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5c (West 1987);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (Anderson 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.927(1) (1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1992).
276. See statutes cited supra note 275.
277. AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (B) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.k58C-5c (West 1987);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (Anderson 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.927(2) (1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(2) (1992).
278. The proposed federal statute could also serve as a model for state legislation.
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federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the
product were grossly inadequate to protect the public from
unreasonable risks of injury or damage.
(2) (a) No product seller shall be liable for any injury to
a claimant allegedly caused by some aspect of the formula-
tion, labeling, or design of a product if the product seller
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product
was subject to premarket licensing or approval by an agency
of the federal government, that the manufacturer complied
with all of the agency's procedures and requirements with
respect to premarket licensing or approval, and that after
full consideration of the product's risks and benefits, the
product was approved or licensed for sale by the agency.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply if
the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the standards or procedures used in the particular
premarket approval or licensing process were grossly inade-
quate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury
or damage.
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply in any
case in which the manufacturer, before or after premarket
approval or licensing of the product, withheld from or mis-
represented to the agency required information that was ma-
terial and relevant to the performance of the product and
was causally related to the claimant's injury.
(3) The provisions of sections (1) and (2) shall not extend
to manufacturing flaws or defects even though the product
manufacturer has complied with all quality control and man-
ufacturing practices mandated by the agency.
Section (1) of the proposal is based on section (f) of Professor
Henderson's proposed federal statute.279 However, unlike the Hen-
derson proposal, section (1) extends the regulatory compliance de-
fense to labeling as well as product design.28 ° Section (2) is modeled
after section 203(b) of Senate Bill 687.28 The language in this sub-
section of Senate Bill 687 applies to punitive damage claims against
the manufacturers of drugs and medical devices licensed by the
FDA. 28 2 In contrast, the provisions of section (2) in the legislation
proposed above apply to claims for compensatory damages and ex-
tend to premarket approval or licensing decisions by federal agencies
as well as to safety standards embodied in formal regulations. Finally,
279. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 632.
280. See id.
281. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(b) (1993).
282. Id.; see supra notes 260-263 and accompanying text.
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section (3), which is original, provides that the regulatory compliance
defense will not apply to manufacturing defects even though the man-
ufacturer has complied with federally mandated manufacturing
practices.
The proposed regulatory compliance defense is subject to a
number of significant exceptions. First of all, the defense will not be
available to a manufacturer if there are no federal safety standards
applicable to the product risk that has allegedly caused the claimant's
injury. In other words, the regulatory compliance defense will not ap-
ply to products or safety risks that are not subject to federal regulatory
standards. In addition, the regulatory compliance defense will not be
applicable if a product has failed to comply with applicable standards
or, in the case of licensing, if the manufacturer has withheld or mis-
represented test data or other information required for submission as
part of the licensing process. Obviously, a regulatory compliance de-
fense should not protect a manufacturer whose products fail to meet
applicable standards. The regulatory compliance defense is also inap-
propriate when a manufacturer has secured premarket approval from
an agency through fraud. Furthermore, compliance with federal
manufacturing practices or quality control procedures will not protect
a product seller from liability when the victim complains of a manu-
facturing defect. Because state tort law works well in this context,
there is no need to displace it.2"' Finally, the regulatory compliance
defense will not be available if the claimant proves by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the product safety standards applied by the
agency were grossly inadequate to protect the public from harm.
Adoption of a regulatory compliance defense such as the one
proposed above will have a number of desirable consequences. First,
it will uphold the integrity of agency decision-making on product
safety issues and protect it against collateral attack in the courts. Sec-
ond, it will insulate product manufacturers against wasteful and un-
necessary litigation. Third, it will check the tendency toward
"overdeterrence" in certain industries.
The proposed regulatory compliance defense ensures that in
most cases courts will rely on applicable federal safety standards,
rather than tort liability rules, to determine whether a product's label-
ing or design is defective. This will reduce overhead costs because
manufacturers can look to criteria that are consistent, specific, and
283. See Viscusi, supra note 73, at 85 ("Strict liability would continue to pertain to manu-
facturing defect cases ....").
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uniform to define their safety responsibilities."8 4 At the same time,
public safety will be protected because the proposed defense allows
consumers to challenge safety standards that do not provide reason-
able protection against product-related risks.
28 5
In addition, the proposed regulatory compliance defense will se-
cure significant administrative cost savings by reducing litigation costs.
At the present time, courts do not give much weight to federal safety
standards in product-labeling or design-defect litigation. As a result,
manufacturers and victims must spend large amounts of money litigat-
ing product safety issues on a case-by-case basis. If the proposed regu-
latory compliance defense is adopted, both parties will know whether
a product is defective, thus avoiding costly litigation.28 6
Finally, the proposed regulatory compliance defense will lessen
the effect of overdeterrence in products liability. Overdeterrence oc-
curs when manufacturers become excessively concerned with poten-
tial tort liability. For example, fear of damage claims has discouraged
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products from introducing new
products and has sometimes induced them to remove existing prod-
ucts from the market.28 7 Airplane manufacturers also have reacted
negatively to potential tort liability by greatly reducing the production
of small aircraft. 288 This sort of overdeterrence is undesirable because
it either removes useful products from the marketplace or greatly in-
284. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Govern-
ment Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 65, 72 (1989)
("The great benefit of regulation is that every party covered by the regulation does not
incur information costs.").
285. Professor Henderson has suggested that plaintiffs be allowed to challenge product
safety standards by showing that the processes by which the standards in question were
established, when compared with other government standard-making processes, were inad-
equate to protect the interests of product users and consumers. See Henderson, supra note
16, at 639 ("[I]t might be shown that the processes by which the regulatory standards were
established, when compared with other governmental standards processes, were inade-
quate to protect the interests of the product users and consumers.").
286. See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort
Reform, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1129, 1134-35 (1994) ("By lending clarity to the definition of rules
and by reducing reliance on relatively inexpert juries in overseeing complex design deci-
sions, regulation can reduce the litigation costs and inefficiency generated by the tort
system.").
287. See Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure
to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs Off the
Market, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 413, 415 (1989-90) ("Potential liability can drive drug
companies to withdraw products from the market, and discourage research into new drugs
used by individuals likely to sue and receive large damage awards."); Walsh & Klein, supra
note 82, at 177 (asserting that tort liability is "forcing the withdrawal of drug products from
the market and inhibiting their introduction in the first instance").
288. See Viscusi, supra note 73, at 8 (contending that tort liability caused the production
of small aircraft to fall from 17,000 in 1979 to 1085 in 1987).
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creases their cost to consumers. By providing manufacturers who
comply with federal safety standards with a "safe harbor," the pro-
posed regulatory compliance defense will help prevent
overdeterrence.
V. A LOOK AT SOCAL COSTS
Because ex ante regulation appears to be cheaper and more effec-
tive than ex post liability, I have proposed a regulatory compliance de-
fense that is intended to secure the advantages of direct regulation
while allowing accident victims to bring tort claims against product
manufacturers when safety standards are clearly inadequate.
Although this approach attempts to maximize the benefits of both
regulation and tort liability, it necessarily involves trade-offs. First,
product safety may be adversely affected to the extent that courts are
foreclosed from imposing higher safety standards on product manu-
facturers. Second, fewer plaintiffs will be compensated for their inju-
ries if a strong regulatory compliance defense is adopted. Although
these social costs are not trivial, I do not believe that they are substan-
tial enough to outweigh the benefits that would accrue from a strong
regulatory compliance defense.
A. Product Safety
A common objection to the regulatory compliance defense is that
its adoption will increase accident costs.2 8 9 Because manufacturers
would be immune from suit as long as their products met federal
product safety standards, they would have little incentive to make vol-
untary improvements in product safety." ° Consequently, accident
costs that would otherwise be deterred by the threat of tort liability
would occur once the threat of tort liability was removed.291
289. See general/yJohnson, supra note 167, at 687 ("[T]his defense would adversely affect
safety incentives.").
290. See Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1139 ("Making the compliance defense stronger
could actually discourage safety by allowing manufacturers to 'sit back' and rely on stan-
dards that are inadequate."); Mark DeSimone, Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Prod-
ucts Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 915, 923
(1980) ("By preventing the courts from determining the standards by which a product is
judged, the defense frustrates product improvement since the manufacturer is satisfied
merely to comply with minimum government regulations.").
291. The accident costs attributable to such a change can be determined by subtracting
existing product-related accident costs from the product-related accident costs that would
occur if a strong regulatory compliance defense were adopted. Existing accident costs can
be expressed mathematically as A-B - (C + D). In this equation, A stands for existing acci-
dent costs; B stands for accident costs that would occur if there were no legal controls over
product safety; C stands for accident-cost savings attributable to government regulation;
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Although the adoption of a strong regulatory compliance defense
will no doubt lead to some increase in product-related accident costs,
it is not clear what the magnitude of this increase will be. This is im-
portant because it would be undesirable to adopt a strong regulatory
compliance defense if its projected social costs are too great. Several
issues seem to be relevant to the question of accident costs. One is the
adequacy of existing federal product safety standards; another is the
deterrent effect of tort liability.
The first issue for consideration is the adequacy of existing prod-
uct safety regulations.292 Some legal scholars object to a strong regu-
latory compliance defense because they believe that federal safety
standards alone cannot adequately protect consumers against prod-
uct-related risks.293 These commentators point out that many federal
safety standards are either obsolete 94 or substantively inadequate.295
and D stands for additional accident-cost savings attributable to tort liability. The shift
from the existing legal regime to one that recognized a strong regulatory compliance de-
fense would result in a new level of accident costs, which would be expressed as A'=B'- (C'
+ D'). B, of course, would remain the same as B. Furthermore, if existing government
regulations were not changed, C'would remain the same as C. Consequently, A'would be
a function of D, and A'would go up as D'went down.
292. Many types of "regulatory failure" exist, although commentators do not always dis-
tinguish among them. They include (1) failure of an agency to regulate a particular class
of products or product risk, (2) inadequate enforcement by the agency of existing safety
standards, (3) deficiencies in the licensing process, and (4) obsolete or substantively inade-
quate safety standards. Adoption of a strong regulatory compliance defense will not in-
crease accident costs associated with the first three types of regulatory failure. For
example, the regulatory compliance defense would have no application to failure to regu-
late situations because it cannot be invoked as a defense against product-related risks un-
less they comply with regulatory standards. The regulatory compliance defense is not
relevant in the second situation either because a manufacturer can invoke the defense only
ifa product actually complies with applicable safety standards. The third type of regulatory
failure occurs when agencies license excessively dangerous products because applicants
have provided incomplete or inaccurate data about potential risks. Once again, a strong
regulatory compliance defense does not aggravate this type of problem because it provides
no protection to manufacturers who deliberately, or even innocently, mislead licensing
agencies.
293. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 80, at 1181 ("Proposals to adopt a regulatory compliance
defense.., suffer from an obvious flaw: they accept regulatory standards that are almost
inevitably incapable of fully forcing manufacturers to internalize the costs of their product
safety decisions."); Schwartz, supra note 173, at 1343 (reasoning that courts must be free to
reject regulatory standards "where regulations are outdated or clearly unsuitable as stan-
dards of care, or where inadequacies in the regulatory process or the misconduct of a
product manufacturer would make the regulatory compliance defense inappropriate").
294. See DeSimone, supra note 290, at 923 ("[G]overnment regulations which may have
been adequate when originally enacted are often obsolete and fall well below the level of
safety needed for products manufactured at a later date.").
295. Safety standards may be substantively inadequate because the agency does not have
sufficient resources or expertise to act independently and must rely upon industry sources
for essential information about product-related risks and safety technology. See Schwartz,
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The implicit assumption behind these observations is that the weaker
federal safety standards are, the more tort liability must be relied
upon to maintain an adequate level of product safety.2 96 Conse-
quently, they argue that because a strong regulatory compliance de-
fense would scale back tort liability, its adoption would be particularly
undesirable if existing regulatory standards were low.
297
Do federal product safety standards really fail to provide suffi-
cient protection to users and consumers? Commentators who ques-
tion the adequacy of regulatory standards often cite examples of past
regulatory failures to prove that regulatory standards are universally
weak,298 or they allege that the regulatory process is subject to sys-
supra note 169, at 1147 (discussing an inherently self-serving process in which agencies rely
on industry-supplied data to formulate industry regulations). Government safety standards
may also be affected by influence exercised over the agency by regulated industries. See
Johnson, supra note 167, at 687 ("Manufacturers have enormous power to influence the
formation of government standards .... ).
296. This can be illustrated by returning to the equation, A=B - (C + D). If A remains
constant, D will increase as C decreases. Therefore, the less accident-cost reduction or
deterrence that direct regulation provides, the more accident-cost reduction or deterrence
will be achieved by tort liability, assuming that total accident costs remain the same.
297. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1146 (fearing the situation in which courts
would apply outdated standards resulting in an undeservedly easy defense for
manufacturers).
It may be recalled that existing product-related accident costs can be expressed by the
equation A=B - (C + D). See supra note 291. C represents accident-cost savings attributable
to direct regulation, and D represents accident-cost savings attributable to tort liability.
Consider two situations: In the first case, C is low and D is high, while in the second case, C
is high and D is low. It is assumed that existing accident costs, represented by A, are the
same.
What would happen in each situation if tort liability were scaled back? This new situa-
tion can be represented by the equation A'=B'- (C'+ D'). Accident-cost savings attributa-
ble to tort liability, represented by D, would decline because the deterrent effect of tort
liability would be lessened. On the other hand, accident costs, represented by A, would
presumably increase, assuming that accident-cost savings attributable to direct regulation,
represented by C, remained the same.
Will the values in the second equation be affected by the respective values assigned to
C and D in the original equation? It appears that the extent to which D' declines (and A'
increases) will depend primarily on how the change affects tort liability rather than on the
magnitude of C or D. For example, a change in tort liability rules that affects only a small
class of regulated products will have a relatively small impact on D'and A'even though C is
small and D is large. On the other hand, if the change affects all regulated products, it may
decrease C' (and increase A') substantially even though C is relatively high and D is rela-
tively low. However, once all other variables are eliminated, it would appear that any
change in tort liability rules affecting regulated products would have a greater effect if C is
low and D is high. In other words, if the scope of tort liability is reduced, accident costs are
likely to be greater if regulatory standards are low instead of high.
298. See infra notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
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temic weaknesses that inevitably cause regulatory standards to be
inadequate.299
This first line of argumentation places a great deal of emphasis
on past regulatory failures. Critics of federal regulation mention the
former federal fabric flammability standard,"' the FDA's licensing of
dangerous drugs,301 and other regulatory fiascos to show that federal
standards are too low to maintain an acceptable level of product
safety. However, examples of past regulatory failures merely demon-
strate that problems have occurred from time to time within a particu-
lar agency; they do not prove that federal safety regulations are
inadequate across the board.
The second line of argument posits the existence of systemic
flaws in the regulatory process that ensure that federal regulations can
never be wholly successful. For example, agencies are said to be
chronically underfunded and, thus, lack the resources necessary to do
their job properly.3 0 2 Agencies are also allegedly dependent upon in-
dustry sources for essential information about product risks and safety
technology. 3 ' Finally, some commentators maintain that agencies
are subject to overwhelming influence and pressure from politicians
and from the industries that they regulate. 0 4 While this regulatory
model identifies many of the conditions that may result in weak regu-
latory standards, it does not prove that they necessarily will be ineffec-
tive. On the contrary, the fact that some agencies appear to do a
299. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
300. This standard was reputedly so low that fabrics as flammable as ordinary toilet tis-
sue could meet it. See David C. Campbell & John F. Vargo, The Flammable Fabrics Act and
Strict Liability in Tort, 9 IND. L. REV. 395, 403 (1976) ("The situation is so bizarre that some
plaintiffis experts have demonstrated that ordinary toilet tissue will pass... the test.").
301. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 173, at 1347-52 (discussing 11 instances in which the
FDA licensed dangerous pharmaceutical products); Daniel W. Sigelman, Turning the Tables
on Drug Companies, 30 TRiAL, Mar. 1994, at 72, 72 (discussing numerous instances of FDA
failure to discover drug-related risks during the licensing process).
302. See Kahn, supra note 80, at 1181 ("The systemic hostility to regulation that charac-
terized the last few presidential administrations effectively gutted many agencies of re-
sources and sapped their political will."); Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1157-58 (describing
the adverse effects of budgetary cutbacks on the regulatory efforts of the FDA and CPSC).
303. See Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1147 ("Industry often controls indispensable data
about the nature and extent of the safety problem that an agency is attempting to address,
as well as information about the technology and costs of reducing or eliminating the
risk.").
304. SeeJohnson, supra note 167, at 687 ("Manufacturers have enormous power to influ-
ence the formation of government standards, with the result that the standards are fre-
quently political compromises at best."); Spradley, supra note 7, at 372 ("Large corporate
manufacturers have the organization and financial resources to lobby government agen-
cies and legislative bodies to adopt minimum safety standards.").
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better job than others indicates that the regulatory model described
above may be unduly pessimistic.
In fact, it is not possible to prove, either empirically or theoreti-
cally, that federal product safety standards are universally inade-
quate."0 5 Conditions do exist that may affect the integrity of the
regulatory process, and admittedly a number of serious regulatory fail-
ures have occurred. However, there is simply not enough evidence to
support the conclusion that most safety standards promulgated by reg-
ulatory agencies are inadequate or that such standards are less rigor-
ous than those formulated by the courts.
Furthermore, even if existing regulatory standards fail to achieve
an acceptable level of product safety, it does not follow that the tort
system will do a betterjob. To be sure, conventional wisdom assumes
that tort liability provides significant incentives for manufacturers to
make their products safer.3" 6 These incentives will be weakened if
305. Of course, there is no general agreement on how to evaluate the adequacy of safety
standards. A popular approach is to measure adequacy in terms of economic efficiency.
See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 73, at 2 ("The task of a well-functioning social risk management
policy is to strike an appropriate balance between safety and the costs incurred to achieve
this safety."). According to this criterion, safety standards should be set at a level where
marginal accident costs equal the marginal costs of preventing them. A safety standard
would be deemed inefficient, and thus inadequate, if it allowed accident costs to occur
which exceeded the costs of preventing them. However, safety regulations may reflect
other values besides economic efficiency. See Stone, supra note 61, at 14 ("There may be a
collective aversion to certain events ... that make us willing to expend more to avert them
than we would suffer in damages were they to occur."). In such cases, other criteria must
be employed to judge the adequacy of safety regulations.
306. See Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 82, at 274 ("Strict product liability induces
manufacturers to make safer products.").
Tort liability operates at two levels to optimize accident costs. On an individual level,
tort liability encourages those engaged in risky activities to reduce the risk of injury in
order to lower their exposure to damage claims. See Brown, supra note 62, at 128 ("[The
imposition of tort liability] provides an incentive for those engaged in a particular activity
to make it safer, for by doing so, their costs will be lower."). For this reason, a manufac-
turer will spend money on product safety so long as the marginal cost of additional safety
measures is less than the marginal reduction of expected tort liability. SeeJames A. Hen-
derson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 768 (1983) ("[A] manufacturer will respond to threatened liability
by investing in safety up to, but not beyond, the point at which the marginal costs of the
investment equal the marginal costs of accidents thereby avoided.").
On an economy-wide level, tort liability promotes economic efficiency by helping to
ensure that the prices of goods and services reflect their true social costs. See Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 1281, 1289-90 (1980) ("[B]y forcing firms whose products or services are responsible
for accident costs to absorb those costs, society [through tort liability] forces the prices of
goods and services to reflect all costs required to make them available, including costs of
accidents."). It is assumed that goods and services will be allocated more efficiently by the
market if their prices include all costs of production. See Calabresi, supra note 171, at 501-
02 (1960) (describing how prices affect the allocation of goods within the economy). If
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product safety standards are determined by regulation alone.3 07 Re-
cently, however, a number of legal scholars have questioned whether
tort liability actually deters risk-generating conduct to any meaningful
degree.308 They point out that in the real world, various factors miti-
gate tort liability's deterrent effects. For example, tort law is so vague
and open-ended that manufacturers cannot rely on it to determine
how safe their products must be to avoid liability.3 09 In addition, cor-
porate decision-makers often discount or ignore long-term risks in or-
der to maximize short-term profits for their firm.310 Moreover, even
when they wish to improve product safety, corporate managers have
difficulty communicating with those responsible for carrying out their
orders.3 1" Finally, the availability of liability insurance reduces the in-
centive to improve product safety because manufacturers can exter-
nalize their liability costs to others in the insurance pool.3 12
In the final analysis, it is difficult to tell whether the conditions
described above actually diminish the deterrent effect of tort liability.
However, the foregoing discussion does suggest that the impact of tort
liability on product safety may be overrated. If that is so, then one
accident costs are fully internalized by manufacturers, prices of dangerous products will
rise and consumption will fall as consumers seek less expensive substitutes. See Richard C.
Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36
WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1107-08 (1990) ("[I]f a manufacturer is forced to raise prices to re-
flect the cost of product injuries, demand for dangerous products will fall accordingly.").
307. See Kahn, supra note 80, at 1185 ("The concerns which result from the fact that the
tort system gives insufficient risk-reduction incentives are obviously not addressed by an
alternative which provides even less adequate incentives.").
308. See William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REv'. 639, 644 ("It is debatable, both analytically and empirically, whether strict
liability increases product safety, much less whether it tends to optimize product safety.");
Sugarman, supra note 87, at 587 ("[T]heorists who defend torts on deterrence grounds
have no convincing empirical support for their position."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Reality
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 405-13
(1994) (discussing a number of recent studies on the deterrent effect of product liability
on manufacturers).
309. See Viscusi et al., Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation, supra note 69, at 1468 ("In the
context of warnings litigation, the absence of meaningful standards is quite trouble-
some."); Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle, supra note 69, at 575-77 (arguing that the risk-
utility standard used in design-defect litigation is too vague to be of much use as an evalua-
tive tool).
310. See Sugarman, supra note 87, at 569 ("Managers tend to worry most about their
short-run profits... rather than the firm's long-term financial health.").
311. See George Eads & Peter Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Cororate Responses to Prod-
uct Liability Law and Regulation, 7J. PROD. LiAz. 263, 278 (1984) (discussing the inadequa-
cies of corporate-level safety efforts absent involvement at lower levels of a company).
312. See Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 46 (1980) (stating that liability insurance "constitutes a serious
hinderance to market deterrence since it creates .. . 'externalization due to insufficient
subcatorization'").
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may also conclude that a strong regulatory compliance defense will
not affect product safety very much even when it substantially limits
tort liability.313
B. Compensation and Risk Distribution
The tort system not only attempts to deter manufacturers from
subjecting consumers to excessive product-related risks; it also serves a
risk-distribution or compensatory function. 1 4 Adoption of a strong
regulatory compliance defense would undoubtedly reduce the
chances of compensation for injured parties because it would protect
manufacturers whose products comply with applicable federal safety
standards from liability.3 1 5
Risk distribution is concerned with how losses are allocated in a
society,"' while loss-shifting3 17 and loss-spreading 18 are two impor-
tant mechanisms for distributing these losses. Both are aspects of
"secondary accident cost avoidance. "319 This principle provides that
the secondary consequences of accidents can be reduced or elimi-
nated if those losses are not left to fall entirely on the victim.3 20 Loss-
shifting involves the shifting of accident losses from the victim to an-
other party, such as an employer or a product manufacturer, with
greater economic resources. Loss-spreading, on the other hand, oper-
ates on the notion that the secondary effects of a catastrophic loss are
lessened if they are spread among members of a large risk pool. 21
Product liability involves both loss-shifting and loss-spreading. First,
the economic costs of product-related injuries are shifted from the
313. To return to the equations, A=B - (C + D) and A'=B'- (C' + D'), additional accident
costs attributable to a strong regulatory compliance defense, A' - A, would presumably be
smaller if D and D' were smaller, as they would be if tort liability had little deterrent effect
on product manufacturers. See supra notes 291, 296-297.
314. SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justi/cation for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. Rxv. 129, 137-38 (1990) ("A tort regime's
ability to allocate the risks of unprevented product accidents may be as important a deter-
minant of that regime's overall efficiency as is its ability to deter product accidents.").
315. See Schwartz, supra note 169, at 1127 (predicting that regulatory reforms "would
erase some of the major advantages that plaintiffs have gained in the development of prod-
ucts liability law over the last twenty years").
316. Ausness, supra note 306, at 1113.
317. See GuIDO CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACcIDENTS 21 (1970) (defining loss shifting as
"the placing of losses on those classes of people or activities who are best able to pay").
318. Id. (explaining loss spreading as "the accomplishment of the broadest possible
spreading of losses, both over people and time").
319. Id.
320. See id. at 27-28.
321. See Calabresi, supra note 171, at 517-18 ("[S]ocial dislocations, like economic dislo-
cations, will occur more frequently if one person bears a heavy loss than if many people
bear lighter ones.").
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victim to the manufacturer; then the manufacturer spreads these costs
to its customers through the pricing mechanism.3 22
However, not all legal scholars believe that the tort system is an
effective mechanism for shifting and spreading product-related acci-
dent costs. Some observe that the tort system overcompensates some
victims3 23 and undercompensates others.3 24 They point out that work-
ers' compensation, private insurance plans, and various social welfare
programs largely duplicate the risk-distribution function of tort liabil-
ity.32 5 Finally, these commentators maintain that the tort system is far
more expensive to administer than either private or public compensa-
tion schemes.3 26 If other mechanisms do a better job of compensa-
tion than the tort system, one can argue that victims should rely on
these systems instead of tort liability to distribute the risks of product-
related injuries.3 27  Because most injured consumers have access to
some source of private or public compensation, foreclosing certain
322. See Keeton, supra note 170, at 856 (commenting that manufacturers "are capable, if
held responsible [for product liability], of passing on to users generally losses suffered by
the few").
323. See Sugarman, supra note 87, at 595-96 (arguing that, in comparison with other
compensation systems, tort law is overly generous to injured parties).
324. Id. at 592-94 (arguing that the consequences of tort law principles often result in
uncompensated or undercompensated victims).
325. See George L. Priest, The Continuing Crisis in Liability, 1 PROD. LiAB. L.J. 243, 248
(1989) ("[W]orkers filing 60 percent of products liability claims are already covered for
disability losses and full medical expenses through workers' compensation. Similarly, the
vast majority of the U.S. population possesses medical coverage .... ). Professor Priest
also points out that tort law, when viewed as a form of forced insurance, is extremely re-
gressive because all consumers pay the same "premium" but high-income claimants typi-
cally receive larger awards than low-income claimants. See George L. Priest, Modem Tort
Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (1987) ("[T]ort law's lumping of low-income
consumers and high-income consumers into the same insurance pool and charging them a
similar premium for insurance, forces low-income consumers to subsidize high-income
consumers.").
326. See Litan, supra note 90, at 135 ("The tort system is an extremely expensive device
for compensating injured parties."). Administrative costs consume more than half of every
dollar spent by manufacturers for product-related claims. Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in
Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 479, 492
(1987) ("Overall, plaintiffs appear to receive, in net compensation, about fifty percent of
tort litigation expenditures."). In contrast, administrative costs consume 30% of every dol-
lar spent on workers' compensation, 15% of every dollar spent on health insurance, and
1% of every dollar spent on the social security system. See Litan, supra note 90, at 135.
327. I would maintain that accident victims who are fortunate enough to recover in tort
actions are often grossly overcompensated. Large damage awards for "pain and suffering"
are common even in cases where pecuniary damages are relatively small. There is nojusti-
fication for multi-million dollar awards for pain and suffering except where the victim suf-
fers serious permanent disfigurement, injuries that require long-term medical care, or
injuries that result in permanent disability.
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classes of tort claims will not necessarily result in large secondary acci-
dent costs.
Another distributional concern is that a strong regulatory compli-
ance defense would benefit large corporations (or their shareholders)
at the expense of accident victims. This regressive transfer of wealth
from a relatively poor group (victims) to an economically advantaged
group (manufacturers) would be socially undesirable. It is true that
accident victims as a group will receive less total compensation if a
strong regulatory compliance defense is adopted and reductions in
tort liability will initially benefit product manufacturers. However, in
a competitive market, a large portion of these savings (as well as the
resulting administrative-cost savings) ultimately will be transferred to
consumers in the form of lower product prices.3"'
C. A Final Assessment of Costs and Benefits
Ordinarily, the best way to determine if a strong regulatory com-
pliance defense should be adopted is to compare costs and benefits.
If the benefits of a strong regulatory compliance defense exceed its
social costs, the defense should be adopted. If the opposite is true,
the regulatory compliance defense should be rejected.
A comparison of costs and benefits requires that both costs and
benefits be identified and quantified. It is fairly easy to identify most
of the social costs and benefits that would accrue from the adoption of
a strong regulatory compliance defense. On the benefit side, a strong
regulatory compliance defense will provide manufacturers with spe-
cific and uniform standards to follow. This would reduce production
costs and allow manufacturers to market their products more cheaply.
In addition, manufacturers who met applicable safety standards would
not have to worry about tort claims and would be free to develop and
market useful but risky products, such as pharmaceuticals. Finally, by
restricting tort liability, a strong regulatory compliance defense would
generate enormous administrative-cost savings.
On the loss side, the lessening of tort liability would deprive man-
ufacturers of some incentive to invest in product safety. Conse-
quently, products would become more dangerous and product-related
accidents would increase accordingly. In addition, by limiting tort lia-
328. If this occurred, one might argue that a strong regulatory compliance defense
transferred wealth from accident victims to consumers in general. While this may be cor-
rect, it cannot be said that such a transfer would be regressive because there is no evidence
to suggest that accident victims are less wealthy than ordinary consumers.
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bility, a strong regulatory compliance defense would deprive many ac-
cident victims of a chance to receive compensation for their injuries.
Having identified the costs and benefits of a strong regulatory
compliance defense, the next step is to quantify them. Unfortunately,
neither costs nor benefits can be easily monetized. On the cost side,
there is no way to calculate the dollar cost of a shift from the present
legal regime to one that limits tort liability by means of a strong regu-
latory compliance defense. Hard economic data is also lacking on the
benefits as well. Because neither the costs nor the benefits can be
quantified accurately, it is impossible to do a formal cost-benefit anal-
ysis on the regulatory compliance defense. Instead, one must rely on
an educated guess to determine whether benefits outweigh losses. In
my opinion, it is reasonable to conclude that a strong regulatory com-
pliance defense is cost effective. On the benefit side, substantial ad-
ministrative-cost savings are virtually certain to occur if the defense is
adopted. On the other hand, product-related accident costs also will
increase if a strong regulatory compliance defense is adopted. My
own view is that this increase will not be very great because tort liabil-
ity does not greatly affect product safety when regulatory standards are
reasonably adequate. Accordingly, I believe that a strong regulatory
compliance defense should be adopted.
CONCLUSION
The present system of product safety regulation is flawed because
courts do not give sufficient weight to federal regulations when they
evaluate the adequacy of labeling or design in product liability cases.
This subjects manufacturers to a wasteful system of dual regulation.
One solution to the problem is for Congress or federal administrative
agencies to preempt state products liability law explicitly. Preemp-
tion, however, involves some significant social costs. For example, it
encroaches upon important state interests and it also prevents injured
consumers from challenging federal standards when they are inade-
quate to protect public safety.
A strong regulatory compliance defense, such as the one pro-
posed here, is another option. A strong regulatory compliance de-
fense would not infringe upon state interests to the same extent as
preemption. At the same time, if this proposal were adopted, injured
parties would be able to challenge federal regulations that were exces-
sively weak. Thus, a strong regulatory compliance defense would pro-
vide all of the benefits of preemption without incurring some of its
costs.
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It has been suggested that the adoption of a strong regulatory
compliance defense might have a negative effect on product-safety
and risk-distribution goals. While this may be correct, I believe that
the benefits of such a defense, particularly in the area of administra-
tive-cost savings, will outweigh these social costs. Accordingly, I rec-
ommend that a strong regulatory compliance defense, such as the one
proposed in this Article, be adopted at both the state and federal
levels.
